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Throughout the 1960s, America witnessed one metropolis 
after another suffer from major civil disturbances. The 
first of these incidents occurred in Selma, Alabama, but it 
was not until Watts, California exploded that the nation 
began to take notice. As America was throttling towards a 
major race war, nobody anticipated the Midwestern town of 
'Omaha, Nebraska to experience the same disturbances larger 
cities had. Although the life of average Omaha blacks was 
better than that of many of their urban counterparts, black 
Omahans still faced frequent job discrimination, lack of 
adequate educational facilities, and general disenchantment 
with Northern ghetto life.
Between July 1966 and August 1969, these feelings were 
manifested physically in the streets. In this three-year- 
period, three riots occurred, increasing in violence each 
time, further alienating both white and black communities. 
By the final riot in 1969, the motives of Omaha's 
disturbances had become completely rage-driven and no 
longer grievance-oriented. The city's reaction to these 
riots was fairly typical. After the first occurrence,
Mayor A.V. Sorensen's administration created numerous 
programs to help re-establish the black community and to 
directly address the. rioters' complaints. After the final 
disturbance, local white merchants were leaving the area en 
masse, and the municipal government was reticent to coax 
anyone back into the neighborhood. Ultimately, any blighted 
community improvement plans were laid aside.
Although the Omaha riots in the late 1960s destroyed 
the once vibrant Near North Side community, the 
disturbances served as an important expression of black 
grievances and rage. As demonstrated in the 1966 
disturbance, the riots were an effective tactic to 
accomplish change in the community, but once injustices 
were no longer articulated, the efficacy of this tactic 
diminished. To many young black Americans, rioting allowed
them to temporarily take back power, thus asserting 
themselves.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First a n d .foremost I would like to thank my parents, 
Hilary and .Jeanne Howard, who many years ago encouraged my 
love of books and history. But most importantly I thank 
them for suggesting this topic to research, long before it 
•was a thesis and a passion. I also thank my sister, Gianna, 
and numerous friends, who have been willing to listen to my 
research, pretend they are interested, and most importantly 
drag me from the decade I often become mired in.
I am very fortunate to study an area in history which 
many of the participants are still very willing to talk 
about their experiences. Thank you kindly for all those 
who were willing to speak with me both on and off the 
record, but none more so than Dan Goodwin, Marvin McClarty, 
Fr. Jack McCaslin, and Senator Ernie Chambers. Your 
recollections have enabled me to tell your stories with the 
details that I hope readers will find as vivid as I did.
I offer my most sincere thanks to the History 
Department at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Without 
significant funding through the Charles and Mary Caldwell 
Martin Research grant and the George and Virginia Dare 
Shuflata Master's Thesis fellowship, I would have not been
able to complete this work. This generous financial 
support allowed me to focus primarily on my research and 
travel the United States to share ideas with other 
scholars. It is such an honor to work in an environment 
where talented, professional scholars, not directly 
involved in my project, forwarded materials that they 
thought may be of use to me. I would especially like to 
extend thanks to Bill Pratt, who though not on my 
committee, always provided a wealth of information to me.
Finally, I thank the members of my committee, Dr. Mary 
Lyons-Barrett, Dr. Richard Breaux, and chairperson, Dr. 
Jerold Simmons. Words alone do not express my absolute 
gratitude for their encouragement, dedication, and patience 
throughout this process.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION_________________  1
CHAPTER
1. THE STATE OF OMAHA BLACKS__________ 4
2. THE RIOT OF 1966__________________ 32
3. THE 'CALM' BEFORE THE STORM_______ 55
4. THE RIOT OF 1969__________________80
CONCLUSION________________ .__________________ 103
APPENDIX I________________________  109
APPENDIX II_________________________________ 136
BIBILIOGRAPHY 138
1Introduction
"A riot is a complex organism. Although there is 
often a single spark.that ignites a riotous situation, 
it is never an isolated specific that creates the 
major force behind the riot. Riots, be they racial, 
social or political, are not created over one long 
incident. Conditions for a riot have to build over a 
period of time. Anger grows until one incident sends 
the people into the streets."
This is the story of a complex organism. One that 
bubbled, boiled, and festered longer than anyone can 
remember. This story did not occur in the usual places. It 
did not come to bear in a mega-metropolis or in the 
oppressive backwoods. This is the tale of protest and rage 
that many did not anticipate. Across the country, America 
witnessed one metropolis after another, suffer from major 
civil disturbances in the 1960s. Taking place in 
predominately African-American areas, these riots were not 
isolated events as many authorities speculated, but related 
directly to racial strife. As the decade progressed, common 
themes of discontent among America's black population began
towards a major race war, the Midwestern city of Omaha, 
Nebraska began to experience the same rioting found in
—Phillip Abbott Luce1
glaringly apparent. As America throttled
1 Julian E. Williams, Bum, Baby, Bum!: Is your city next? (Tulsa: Christian Crusade, May 1968),
1.
larger cities. Although Midwesterners, Omaha blacks were 
not exempt from feeling the same hopelessness, 
dissatisfaction, and desperation.that blacks had- felt for 
decades. Over one long, hot weekend in July 1966 these 
feelings became manifest, and in turn ushered in an era 
where a new tactic, violence, was used to voice the needs 
of the community.
1966 was once referred to as the "the year the Negro 
became black" It was in this year that Stokely Carmichael 
screamed "Black Power" at a steamy Greenwood, Mississippi 
rally. Floyd McKissick became head of the Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE) directing the organization's focus 
to the black ghetto, and Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, in 
their ten-point Black Panther Party for Self-Defense 
platform, declared that "We want freedom. We want power to 
determine the destiny of our black and oppressed 
communities."2 Many conservative leaders, such as Roy 
Wilkins, saw Black Power as the "father of hatred and the 
mother of violence."3 However for many young African-
2Ibram Rogers, “Celebrating Forty Years o f Activism,” Diverse: Issues in Higher Education, Vol. 
23 (2006): 18-22.
3Robert H. Brisbane, Black Activism: Racial Revolution in the United States: 1954-1970 (Valley 
Forge: Judson Press, 1974), 149.
Americans, Black Power armed them with a "political 
vocabulary" used to affect change in their world.4
4Rusty L. Monhollon, This Is America?: The Sixties in Lawrence, Kansas (New York: Pal grave, 
2004), 85.
4CHAPTER ONE 
THE STATE OF OMAHA BLACKS
"The Negro in the Midwest feels injustice and 
discrimination no less painfully because he is a thousand 
miles from Harlem."2 David L. Lawrence
Historically the Near North Side served as home for 
new immigrants.2 As they began to accrue financial wealth 
and lost more of their ethnic identity, many moved from the 
area and made room for newly arriving ethnic minorities.
Over the course of one hundred years, each ethnic group 
transformed this region into their own. Irish,
Scandinavian, and German immigrants settled along the Near 
North Side during the mid-nineteenth century; mainland 
Italians and Eastern Europeans followed in the early 1900s.3 
However it was not until 1910 that this area's demographic 
drastically changed.
Southern African-American migrants created the first 
black settlement in Omaha in 1898 on the south side along
'“Bias Felt Anywhere” Omaha Star, December 10, 1965
2The Near North Side, also called the Second Ward, was bordered by Cuming Street to the South, 
Ames Street to the North, Thirtieth Street to the West and Sixteenth Street to the East. It was first outlined 
by Edward Sayre in a map drawn in 1854. James R. Wead, “An Ecological Study of the Second Ward” 
(master’s thesis, Omaha University, 1953), 7.
3 Landmarks Heritage Preservation Commission, Patterns on the Landscape: Heritage 
Conservation in North Omaha (Omaha: Klopp Printing Company, 1984), 3.
5Twenty-Fourth Street. As the years passed, the boundaries 
of this black community expanded from Dodge Street to the 
southernmost border of Omaha. Eventually this area became 
the hub of violence and vice in the city. Trying to escape 
these negative influences, local African-Americans created 
a second black neighborhood, again on Twenty-Fourth Street 
but this time on the north side of Dodge Street. The first 
movement to the second black enclave began in 1910. As the 
European population moved out, professional and upwardly 
mobile blacks moved in. The Near North Side soon became the 
main business area for blacks, and they continued to come 
to Omaha to improve their financial circumstances. As one 
early student of the neighborhood noted: "the economic 
motive was the chief reason for the movement to Omaha...The 
ravages of the boll weevils in the summer of 1915 and 1916 
greatly diminished the crops over most of the densely 
populated sections of the black belt and served as another 
incentive for the migration."4 Other reasons for this 
"Great Migration" to the North included the dissatisfaction 
with conditions in the South and the labor shortages in the
4Wead, “Ecological Study,”21.
6North due to diminished immigration and the growth of war- 
related industry.5
Surprisingly, until the lale 1800s, black Oiriahans 
could purchase houses wherever they could afford them. 
Beginning in 1902 real estate advertisements specifying 
racial qualifications appeared in local newspapers. These 
red-lining practices eventually caused the index of 
dissimilarity, which social scientists use to measure the 
degree of racial segregation, to increase from 36% to 47% 
in the ten years between 1910 and 1920.6 However 
distasteful, this racial segregation encouraged a distinct 
and flourishing black culture on Omaha's Near North Side.
Blacks began arriving in large numbers to Omaha 
seeking employment with the Union Pacific rail'road, first 
as construction laborers, then relocating their families at 
this Eastern terminus as they continued to travel the line 
as porters and cooks. "The Negro was not only encouraged to 
come to Omaha but agents were dispatched to the South 
soliciting them and in many instances, transportation was
5David R. McMahon, ‘The Origins of the NAACP in Omaha and Lincoln, Nebraska 1913-1926” 
(master’s thesis, Creighton University, 1993), 23-24.
6Delpaneaux Walakafra-Wills, A Short Historical Analysis o f the Urbanization o f the African- 
American in Nebraska (Omaha, NE: University of Nebraska at Omaha Library, January 1976), 11.
provided."7 Prior to 1910 most Omaha blacks were employed i 
the service sector, but between 1914 and 1920 meat packing 
houses began to register increases of up to fifty percent 
in their black personnel.8
As the black population grew, its members created 
their own thriving community complete with grocery stores, 
professional offices, and social halls.9 The neighborhood' 
strategic location along a streetcar route made North 
Twenty-Fourth Street a main business thoroughfare. These 
family-owned businesses provided a variety of services to 
the local community including barber shops, dime stores, 
and restaurants.10 Though a relatively small Midwestern 
city, Omaha attracted numerous jazz musicians because of 
its strategic location on the main line of the Union 
Pacific Railroad. As a result the Near North Side drew 
both big bands and white patrons to the Dreamland and 
Carnation Ballrooms. There concert goers could hear 
nationally acclaimed recording artists including Count 
Basie, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie, and native son
7James Harvey Kerns, “Industrial and Business Life o f Negroes in Omaha” (master’s thesis, 
Municipal University of Omaha, 1932), 5-7.
8Ibid.
9 Landmarks Heritage Preservation Commission, Patterns on the Landscape, 3.
10Patrick S. Garland, “Black Economic Development in Omaha” (M.B.A. thesis, Creighton 
University, 1971), 21.
8Preston Love. Love often referred to Omaha as "the Triple 
A of baseball for black music. The next stop was the big 
leagues ."n
Blacks in Omaha created their own social structure 
which at times paralleled the white community's. Since 
white Nebraskans excluded African-Americans from events 
such as the Aksarben ball, black Omahans created their own 
gala and elected a King Borealis and a Queen Aurora each 
year.. Middle class black women joined the National 
Federation of Afro American Women, headed nationally by the 
wife of Booker T. Washington. Adults often belonged to 
various social clubs including fraternities, sororities, 
and other groups such as the Benevolent and Protective 
Order of Elks, Eastern Star’, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters and Dining Car Waiter's Union. Other North Side 
fixtures included the Colored Old Folks Home and the North 
Side YWCA, which provided women's club activities.12
Though African Americans in Omaha shared many of the 
same aspirations as their white counterparts, the greater 
Omaha community did not perceive them as .equals. The year
nBertha W. Calloway and Alonzo N. Smith, Vision o f Freedom on the Great Plains: An 
Illustrated History o f African Americans in Nebraska (Virginia Beach, VA: Donning Company, 1998), 106, 
115.
12 Ibid., 60-66.
91919 proved to be one of the bloodiest years in America for 
racial violence and Omaha was no exception. On September 
28, 1919, a group of white Omahans, in the pattern of other 
lynch mobs throughout the Red Summer, went to the 
courthouse. There they demanded the release to their 
custody of Will Brown, a black man who had been accused of 
raping a white woman. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 stormed 
the courthouse at 1701 Farnam Street, intent on vigilante 
violence. Police officers used hoses to deter the crowd 
but that further angered the masses. Rioters broke into 
local stores gathering guns, ammunition, axes, and gas 
which they used to make fire bombs to hurl at the 
courthouse. Firefighters arrived, at the scene and were 
greeted with howls as the rioters cut their water hoses and 
stole ladders to scale the building. Fire Battalion Chief 
Patrick Cogan was even assaulted by the crowd.13
Mayor Edward P. Smith attempted to intervene stating 
"I will not give up the Negro! I will give my life 
protecting the law!" and he nearly did.14 The mob seized 
him and hung him from a traffic signal pole on Sixteenth 
and Harney streets. Police Officers Ben Danbaum and Charles
13 Larry M Scalise, Donald L. Nichols, Jr., and Charles W. Wesson, The History o f the Omaha 
Fire Department 1860-1993 (Omaha: Professional Fire Fighters Association of Omaha, 1995), 33-34.
14 Calloway and Smith, Vision, 67.
10
Van Deusu cut him down before he suffocated. Brown, 
however, was not so lucky. The mob snatched him from the 
courthouse and hung him from a telephone pole on Eighteenth 
and Harney Streets. They riddled him with bullets, and 
using a car, dragged him to Seventeenth and Dodge Streets.15 
Then in classic early twentieth century style, the group 
burned his body and posed for a picture as smoke rose from 
Brown's corpse. The mob, not satisfied with the blood 
already spilt that night, marched toward the Near North 
Side. As the mob arrived they encountered a surprise. Local 
black residents waited for the mob perched on their 
rooftops with guns ready to protect their homes and 
businesses. The United States Army quickly intervened and 
the majority of rioters fled the scene.16
With the new influx of black migrants into the city, a 
strained antagonism began to simmer between the black and
l5Scalise, and others, History o f the Omaha Fire Department, 33-34. It is important to note that 
although the lynching was a racially motivated act, politically motivated factors must also be considered. 
Political boss Tom “Old Man” Dennison sought to convince the public that Omaha was in a state of deep 
turmoil. With the help of the Omaha Bee, Dennison promoted a vision of the city in which the police were 
inept and his political opponent, Mayor Edward Smith, let chaos rule. In the end, local black newspaper, 
the Omaha Monitor best summarized Dennison’s role in the lynching, reporting that at work was the 
“hidden, but not wholly concealed hand, of those who would go to any extreme to place themselves in 
power.” The Omaha Monitor as cited in Orville D. Menard, Political Bossism in Mid-America: Tom 
Dennison’s Omaha, 1900-1933 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 88.
16 Calloway and Smith, Vision o f Freedom, 64-68. Earlier that year, on March 22, 1919, at a 
NAACP meeting Reverend W. F. Botts stated that Police Chief Ebersteing should protect the black 
community if riots occurred. Someone in the audience replied that instead blacks should be prepared to 
defend themselves, and Botts replied, “That’s the right spirit.” At the meeting 120 people joined the 
NAACP on the spot. McMahon, “Origins of the NAACP,” 62.
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white communities. The 1920s brought greater race 
consciousness to Omaha as Marcus Garvey's "New Negro" 
mentality began to permeate the black community.17 After 
the dramatic increase in population between 1910 and 1920 
residential segregation began to increase creating a surge 
in organized community activity. Black businesses and 
professionals began to rely primarily on black clientele as 
fewer whites patronized their businesses.18 Reverend John 
Albert Williams, founder of the Omaha Monitor newspaper and 
a vocal supporter of the emerging business strip, saw North 
Twenty Fourth Street as a symbol of black pride and 
achievement.19 Blacks were on the move in Omaha.
In 1910, blacks comprised less than one percent of the 
population on the Near North Side but by 1950 they were 
fifty-one percent. Omaha's black population on the Near 
North Side exploded from a mere 110 residents to 10,192 in 
just forty years.20 Between 1940 and 1950 alone, Nebraska's 
urban black population grew from 14,171 to 18,453 due to 
the war time industrial boom.21 During the Second World
17Calloway and Smith, Visions o f Freedom, 99.
18Ibid., 61.
19Ibid , 67.
20Wead, Ecological Study, 21.
2,U.S. Bureau of the Census, Race by Sex, fo r the State, Urban and Rural, 1950, and fo r  the State 
1880 to 1940. Prepared by the Geography Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C, 1952.
12
War, Omaha truly had a vibrant, bustling, and cosmopolitan 
black community. Outside of the confines of this haven, 
however, they faced the har3h realities of being black in 
America. Evoking the idea of a "Double V " , victory over 
fascism abroad and racism at home, Omaha blacks went to 
work for equality but still remained a marginalized 
population.22
By the 1960s Omaha's 25,000 black citizens comprised 
an increasing percentage of Omaha's total population 
climbing from 8.3% in 1960 to just under 10% in 1970.23 The 
Omaha Star estimated that their readership alone pumped 
$600,000 a day into the local economy.24 By the end of the 
turbulent sixties, no fewer than 34,000 black citizens made 
Omaha their home.25 Although their numbers and purchasing 
power grew, their second class status remained.
In 1966, the black community was not totally without 
representation. While no black members sat on the Omaha 
City Council, one of the forty-nine members of the state's 
unicameral legislature was an African-American. The Omaha 
Board of Education included one black board member, but
22Ibi«I, 126.
23 “Percentage of Black Population in Midwest Cities,” Omaha World-Herald, September 20, 
1986. Harl Dalstrom, A.V. Sorensen and the New Omaha (Omaha: Lamplighter Press, 1988), 200.
24“Visit the New Wool worth,” Omaha Star, October 19, 1962.
25Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 200.
13
there was no black representation on the Douglas County 
Board of Health, Board of Commissioners, Metropolitan 
Utilities District, Omaha Airport Authority, Sarpy County 
Board of Commissioners, Omaha Public Power District, or the 
Omaha County Planning Board.26
Racial covenants severely restricted black Omahans' 
ability to leave the immediate area of the Near North Side.
i ^
The Omaha Real Estate Board refused to end racial 
discrimination in the housing market. The Human Relations 
Board reached a compromise with the Real Estate Board by 
asking agents to expand a 1959 policy against religious 
discrimination in housing. Real Estate Board President 
Norman Keegan stated that he would ask home owners to 
follow the provisions in the 1959 policy but ultimately 
would respect their wishes and would allow them to alter 
and initial the disclaimer to allow for racial
26“Blacks Serving on Elected and Appointed Governing Boards: 1966 and 1986,” Omaha World- 
Herald, September 19, 1986. Though Omaha African-Americans were severely underrepresented, there 
were still people who kept their interests in mind. None contributed more than Senator Edward Danner 
who pressed five civil rights measures within the first two weeks o f 1963 including a repeal on the ban of 
inter-racial marriages (LB 179), establishing employment without discrimination as a civil right (LB 347), 
the prohibition of discrimination in public places (LB 364), a fair housing act (LB 596) and outlawing the 
poll tax as a requirement to vote (LB 49). “Fifth Civil Right Measure Offered,” Omaha Star, January 13, 
1963. Danner was a black Omahan who labored as a butcher in the South Omaha packinghouses before 
beginning his tenure in politics. Danner also served as vice-president for the United Packingworkers of 
America, Local 47. Calloway and Smith, Visions o f Freedom, 61. Website for the Warner Institute for 
Education in Democracy, sponsored by the Nebraska State Legislature. Accessed July 18, 2006. 
http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/institute/former legislators/danner.htm.
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discrimination.27 In 1963 of all the new houses available 
on the market, 25,000 were allotted for whites and only 
fifty for blacks.28 In 1964, Central Surveys Incorporated 
of Shenandoah, Iowa conducted a survey which showed that if 
racial covenants did not exist, 29% of Near North Side 
residents would move out of the ghetto immediately, and 48% 
desired to move but could not because of insufficient 
funds.29 Although Omaha never had formal legal segregation, 
the denial of rights took subtle, yet devastating forms.30 
By 1965, surveys showed that Omaha had as great a level of 
residential segregation as Birmingham, Alabama.31 These 
factors left the Near North Side with a disproportional 
saturation of black citizens and with all the problems a 
forgotten populace faces.32
As their numbers grew larger the standard of living 
for black Omahans continued to decline. A visit from 
Julius Williams, director of the regional NAACP chapter in
27Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 200.
28“Omaha Real Estate Board Head Dedicated to Maintain Ghetto,” Omaha Star, February 22,
1963.
29“Housing Attitudes Survey Reveals Different Views,” Omaha Star, June 19, 1964.
30Lawrence H. Larsen and Barbara J. Cottrell, The Gate City: A History o f Omaha, Enlarged Ed. 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 272.
3,“Omaha and Birmingham Run Neck-And-Neck in Housing Segregation,” Omaha Star, February
5, 1965.
32 Though the Near North Side served as a business location for small time entrepreneurs to build 
their stores, in 1965, fifty percent of all buildings located along a ten block strip from Ames to Cuming 
Streets along North Twenty-Fourth remained vacant. Omaha City Directory (Kansas City, MO: R.L. Polk 
& Co., 1965), 75-77.
15
Kansas City, declared black housing in Omaha to be 
"lousy."33 Nebraska Governor Frank Morrison called the Near 
North Side "an environment unfit for human habilitation in 
many areas."34 Statistically speaking the Near North Side 
was an undesirable area in which to live. Over thirty-four 
percent of the deteriorating houses and twelve percent of 
the dilapidated homes in Omaha were found on the Near North 
Side. In 1960 the median house in Omaha was assessed at 
$11,700. In two of the census tracts that comprised the 
Near North Side, the average house was valued at $7,600 and 
$7,100. The remaining two tracts had even lower values.35
In July of 1966, the city of Omaha published, through 
the Community Renewal Project, a report outlining the areas 
in the city that the commission considered to be "blighted" 
and prescribing various methods for improvement. The city 
defined "blighted" as an area in which conditions were 
"below community standards of suitability for living or 
doing business." The survey, conducted between January and 
February of 1964, found that the entire Near North Side 
qualified as a "blighted" area. No neighborhoods west of
33 “Problems Behind, Trouble Remains,” Omaha World-Herald, July 7, 1966.
34 Larsen and Cottrell, Gate City, 274.
35 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Year Moved into Unit, Automobiles Available, and Value o f Rent o f  
Occupied Housing Units, by Census Tracts, 1960. Prepared by the Geography Division in Cooperation with 
the Housing Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., 1962.
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Forty-Second Street, with a predominately white populace, 
were considered in need of help.
In this report planners portioned the Near North Side 
into five distinct areas: Kellom Heights, the Near North 
Distribution Center, Conestoga, Horace Mann, and Saratoga. 
The Conestoga area, the worst of all of these zones, had 
almost all of the residences in this area valued under 
$10,000 with over 50% assessed at under $5 , 000 .36 In Tract 
fifteen, the Kellom Heights neighborhood, the commission 
found that 45% of the housing was either deteriorating or 
dilapidated. 41% of the housing in the Conestoga area was 
deteriorating or dilapidated, 21% in the Horace Mann zone, 
and 7% in the Saratoga division. The city average was 13%.37
The predominately residential area of Horace Mann or 
Area 5B, consisted of 579 square acres. The survey 
concluded that "the area is suffering from general decay." 
Although the commission located many adequate structures, 
the largest concentration of blight was found in the 
northeast quarter of the area.38 Two public schools,
36 Community Renewal Program, July 1966 Report Neighborhood Analysis (Omaha, NE: GPO, 
1966), 1-7. Hereafter referred to as Community Renewal Program followed by neighborhood and page 
number.
37 United States Bureau of Census, Occupancy and Structural Characteristics o f Housing Units 
by Census Tracts, 1960. Prepared by the Geography Division in cooperation with the Housing Division, 
Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., 1962.
38 Community Renewal Program, Horace Mann, 1-6.
17
Lothrop Grade School and Horace Mann Junior High, serviced 
the area and between them Kountze Park provided some green 
space.39 In the Near North Distribution Area, Kellom Park 
included a swimming pool immediately adjacent to the school 
compound, serving as the only swimming facility in the Near 
North Side.40
In a blighted community problems compound. Landlords 
often preyed on residents of the Near North Side by 
maintaining high rents but avoiding necessary improvements 
on their properties. In an attempt to maximize profits, 
landlords would convert single family homes into inadequate 
apartments.. This contributed to over one-fifth of the 
available housing units on the Near North Side being termed 
as overcrowded, with more than one person to a room. In 
addition, many home-owners, although willing, found 
themselves unable to improve their properties because of 
the lack of capital, contributing further to the blight in 
the community.41
39Ironically, this park also was the site of the Trans-Mississippi Exposition which Omaha hosted in 
1898. The exposition featured an “old plantation” which ultimately became the most popular exhibition on 
the midway, in which paying customers could witness first hand “the old black aunty and the little 
pickaninny., .the voodoo and the hoodoo.” At this huge exhibit fair goers could see twelve genuine log 
cabins occupied by “genuine darkies.” Calloway and Smith,'Vision of Freedom on the Great Plains, 55.
40 Community Renewal Program, Near North Distribution Center, 1-6.
41Garland, “Black Economic Development,” 11-12.
18
Throughout the 1960s, studies showed drastic 
segregation in Omaha's public schools. Of the 7,667 
minority students enrolled in the district in 1962, 5,113 
were enrolled in predominately (80% or more) minority 
schools. Only 25% of minority students attended white 
majority schools.42 African-American instructors largely 
taught at majority black schools. At the beginning of the 
1963-1964 school year, there were only seventy-six black 
teachers employed by the district, less than 5% of the 
total professional staff. In 1964 the Omaha School board 
hired a handful of new black teachers but assigned them 
mostly to predominately African-American grade schools.43
While the school board showed no inclination to 
address the problem of segregation, in November 1962, 
Superintendent Harry S. Burke did commission a study of 
school facilities that demonstrated a desperate need for 
improvement on the Near North Side. Burke then pressed for 
approval of a $25 million bond issue that led to the 
construction of the new Conestoga School complete with
42Preliminary Analysis of Department of Justice, July 16, 1973, School Bussing Vertical File at 
Florence Public Library. Surprisingly, ninety-three percent of Omaha’s school age blacks were enrolled in 
high school compared to only eighty-three percent of whites. Yet few went to college. The 1960 census 
reported only 469 black college students enrolled in institutions in Omaha and Lincoln. U. S. Bureau of 
the Census, School Enrollment by Level and Type o f School, by Color, fo r  the State, Urban and Rural, 
1960. Prepared by the Geography Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., 1961.
43“Number of Negro Teachers Upped,” Omaha Star, September 4,1964.
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twenty-nine classrooms, a library, health unit, teachers 
lounge, guidance and counseling suite, and an Operation 
Head Start program.44
Omaha was reaping the benefits of the booming post-war 
economy. In the 1960s Omaha operated as the world's largest 
livestock market and meat-packing center and functioned as 
the hub of eight principal train lines making the Gate City 
the fourth largest railroad center in the country. Omaha 
also served as the home office for thirty-six insurance 
companies, and several federal agencies, yet Omaha blacks 
did not receive their fair share of the wealth. Of the 
5,427 black males over the age of fourteen who were 
employed in Omaha, 1,814 worked in manufacturing, 1,525 
worked in meat packing, and 563 worked in transportation 
and public utilities. . Although blacks held jobs in these 
major industries, they were often in menial roles.45
A report looking at the hiring practices of the 
federal government in Omaha found that 522 blacks in Omaha 
were employed by federal agencies, but only 5% of these
44Construction costs totaled $935,000 with an additional $400,000 set aside for the acquisition of a 
ten acre site. “Conestoga School Dedication Set for Sunday, March 27,” Omaha Star, March 25, 1966. 
“Northside School Among First To Be Planned,” Omaha Star, February 8, 1963.
45U.S. Bureau of the Census, Industry o f the Employed by Race and Class o f Worker, and o f the 
Experienced Civilian Labor Force by Color, by Sex, For the State and for Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas o f250,000 or More: 1960. Prepared by the Geography Division, Bureau of the Census 
Washington, D.C., 1963.
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employees held supervisory roles. The black employees' pay 
directly related to their positions. Fifty-five percent of 
black workers earned less than $5,000 a year, and less than 
three percent earned over $7,000, compared to twenty-seven 
percent of white workers.46 Among the general population, 
Omaha's white families earned a median wage of $4,925, 
while black families earned only $3,418 in I960.47 The 
average national income for urban families was $6,166.48
Job opportunities had not improved measurably for 
black laborers since the depression.49 One of the largest 
employers in Omaha, Cudahy Meat Packing, laid off .470 
employees; more devastatingly ninety percent of the black 
males laid off and fifty percent of the black females acted 
as head of household.50 In an article written for the Omaha 
Star, Ernie Chambers, later state senator from North Omaha, 
noted that "'Negro' jobs miraculously [become] 'White' jobs 
when they get cleaned up and become less heavy and risky."51
46“17 of 27 Federal Agencies Hire Negroes in Omaha, Survey Reports Reviewed,” Omaha Star, 
January 31, 1964.
47U. S. Bureau of the Census, Income in 1959 of Families and Unrelated Individuals, by Color fo r  
the State Urban and Rural, I960. Prepared by the Geography Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, 
D C ., 1963.
48Ibid.
49 Larsen and Cottrell, Gate City, 272.
50The majority of Cudahy workers were African-Americans. Dalstrom, A.V. Sorensen, 133.
51 Ernest W. Chambers, “A Militant Look at Black Poverty,” Omaha Star, December 30, 1966.
The Omaha Star offers one of the most comprehensive accounts of the civil rights struggle in Omaha, their
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Such was the case as the packing houses became mechanized. 
Unfortunately with skills only to work in blue collar 
positions, many of the black families fell on hard times.52 
Packinghouse positions were considered one of the better 
jobs an African-American male could hold. An unskilled or 
common laborer in a big four meat packing company could 
earn $2.42 an hour.53
Mayor A.V. Sorensen stated that the processing centers 
had declined because of the out-moded multi-story packing 
plants, the competition from smaller plants with modern 
equipment and lower labor costs, and the fact livestock 
buyers were purchasing directly from stock-raisers not
54central markets. To combat the negative repercussions of 
the loss of a major industry, Mayor Sorensen created 
Project 470 to help workers laid off by Cudahy. Through 
the aid of this program, 85% of the workers found new jobs 
at a lower pay, but it was a start.55 In 1964 the Fort 
Worth Armour plant also had major lay-offs. It can be 
assumed that what happened to workers there happened to
motto being “dedicated to the service of the people that no good cause shall lack a champion and that evil 
not go unopposed.” Omaha Star, May 6, 1960.
52 “Seventy Percent of Uncalled Workers Are Negroes; Sen. Rdward Danner Meeting Triggers 
Widespread Action,” Omaha Star, November 5, 1965.
53Lawrence A. Danton, “The Omaha Experiment, A Study of A Community Effort to Cope with 
Unemployment Resulting From Plant Mechanization” (PhD dis., University of Nebraska, 1964), 66.
4Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 190-191.
55Ibid., 139.
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packing plant workers in Omaha. In the case of Fort Worth, 
of the employees who were laid off and re-trained, 80% of 
the whites found jobs either directly or indirectly related 
to their skills and training, compared to only 60% of 
Latinos and 40% of black employees.56 Further adding to the 
plight of black laborers, between 1968 and 1969 Cudahy, 
Armour and Swift, all major employers, closed their Omaha 
plants .57
Job prospects for young black males were equally poor 
in Omaha. In 1960 only 27% of .black American males ages 
fourteen to seventeen were actively in the workforce and 
barely 79% of males ages eighteen to twenty-four held 
jobs.58 Nebraska employment opportunities for black males 
over the age of fourteen were scarce. Fewer than 3% of 
white males over the age of fourteen were jobless while 8%
5 9of black males found themselves in the same predicament.
Omaha lawmakers often ignored or underestimated the 
Near North Side's recreational needs.60 As early as 1937
56George P. Shulltz and Arnold R. Weber, Strategies fo r  the Displaced Worker: Confronting 
Economic Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 164.
57Garland, “Black Economic Development,” 9.
58U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Force, by Age and Sex, fo r  States, Urban and Rural, I960 
and fo r  the Untied States, 1950 and 1940. Prepared by the Geography Division, Bureau of the Census, 
Washington, D.C., 1963.
59U. S. Bureau of the Census, 'Employment Status, by Color and Sex, fo r  the State: 1940 to 1960, 
Prepared by the Geography Division, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., 1961.
60“Center YMCA Launches Its Fall Programs,” Omaha Star, September 3, 1965.
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one study observed that "The Negro boy in Omaha is 
handicapped by not having a sufficient number of activities 
that are properly guided. His leisure time is mostly spent 
on street corners, in pool halls and other places that 
encourage a low standard of behavior."61 Generally speaking 
the Near North Side could be divided into two distinct 
neighborhoods, east of Twenty-Fourth Street and West of 
that point. According to Louis B. Olsen "there are no 
recreational facilities in the western half of this part of 
the ghetto’--absolutely nothing."62
In 1960 the Parks and Recreation Department of Omaha 
planned to increase and better Omaha's recreational 
facilities. Overcrowding at the city's golf courses 
prompted the building of a new one costing $300,000 located 
in Benson Park. The committee also proposed to build five 
swimming pools at the cost $700,000 in Upland Park, Spring 
Lake Park, and Gallagher Park, none of which would be 
located on the Near North Side. The city additionally 
submitted for approval a plan to spend $200,000 for one 
boat marina. Finally, authorities allocated only $5,000 for
61Glenn Sullenger, “A Study of Opportunities of Boys in Omaha” (thesis, Municipal University of 
Omaha, 1937), 66.
62Tommy Perry, “City Opening New Teenage Center On Near North Side,” Omaha World-Herald 
July 8, 1966.
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landscaping, equipping and improving new or existing 
parks.63 Considering the disregard for the needs of the 
black community, concerned Omaha blacks did not stand idly 
by.
Activism in Omaha began nearly fifteen years earlier 
in the immediate post-World War II era when the De Porres
i
club implemented the type of non-violent direct action 
tactics which would later characterize the struggle in the 
South. The De Porres Club, founded by F r . John Markoe and 
Denny Holland, honored the ideas of its namesake, Saint 
Martin De Porres, a sixteenth century mixed heritage friar 
who served the disadvantaged in Peru. The group was bold, 
brave, innovative, and integrated. Their first victory 
came by boycotting a dry cleaner. The business, fearing a 
loss of income, decided to include blacks as employees.
The club quickly moved on to fighting other injustices with 
pickets and petitions, pamphlets and boycotts. They 
picketed the Coca-Cola bottling plant and boycotted Reed's 
Ice Cream Company, both for discriminatory hiring 
practices. Despite these successes, the group faced 
hardships too. Creighton University officials restricted
63 Capital Improvement Schedule, report ordered by Omaha Mayor John Rosenblatt, November 
1960, Omaha City Planning Board. Parks and Recreation-Vertical File at Florence Public Library.
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their use of meeting space on campus in 1947, forcing 
members to find new meeting facilities where they could
along North Twenty-Fourth Street. They ultimately found a
\
permanent location at Mildred Brown's Omaha Star offices.64
Their boycotting tactics remained simple yet 
effective. First Holland and Markoe would appeal to the 
person in charge at the business, either face to face or in 
a letter. If this did not persuade the owner to change his 
or her ways, the group went public. Members and supporters 
demonstrated and distributed handbills to decrease the flow 
of patrons into the business. The group staged a "sit-in" 
twelve years before the A & T students used the tactic at a 
Woolworths in Greensboro, North Carolina. Four years before 
the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott made Rosa Parks into a 
national icon and launched the career of Martin Luther King 
Jr., the De Porres Club successfully boycotted Omaha's 
street car system.65 They called for a complete boycott of 
the system, and if supporters could not avoid using the 
system, they asked patrons to pay the fare with eighteen 
pennies. Their 1960 motto was to "Do Something" and they 
did exactly that, petitioning Governor Ralph Brook to end
64Leo Adam Biga, “Killing Jim Crow,” Omaha Reader, January 20, 2005, 10-13.
65Bob Reilly, “It Has Been the Few Who Have Acted, Who Have Saved Us From Unspeakable 
Scandal,” Window, Winter Issue 1995-1996, 6.
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teacher placement based on race.66 In its fourteen years the 
De Porres Club won many battles and made many enemies, 
enough to garner their own file in the records of the FBI.67
Through arduous and hard-won fights, the De Porres 
Club and other Nebraska civil rights organizations such as 
the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, the NAACP and 
the Urban League made some headway. In 1960 the NAACP 
boycotted five major stores in Omaha because of their 
discriminatory hiring practices.68 The following year its 
leaders launched a new campaign encouraging "self help 
through selective buying."69 Despite, this activism, the 
NAACP in Omaha faced pressures from above. In 1963 the 
National Office charged them with lagging membership and a 
failure to "participate constructively" in the NAACP 
Freedom Fund project. Critics claimed that too many in 
Omaha wanted to be in charge and too few wanted to take 
orders. Others cited the lack of activity in the legal 
redress committee and noted the failure of the sympathy
66“De Porres Presents Petitions to Governor Brook,” Omaha Siar, February 19, 1960.
67 Biga, “Killing Jim Crow,” 12.
68“Omaha NAACP Votes Unanimously to Boycott Five Omaha Chain Stores,” Omaha Star, 
March 31, 1960.
69“Omaha N.A.A.C.P. Launches Selective Buying Campaign,” Omaha Star, July 28, 1961.
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picket for those in Birmingham and the unwillingness to
• 70work with other groups.
An Ebony article reported that the "Negro leaders who 
lack the skills of mobilization are being pushed aside by 
younger, bolder men."71 Other groups such as the Citizens 
Coordinating Committee for Civil Liberties (4CL) took heed. 
This group formed by the Omaha Negro Ministers Association 
trained their foot soldiers at Mount Zion Church.72 In June 
1963 the new group issued its mission statement. The 
organization claimed that they were "born out of the 
realization for the need for united action and along with 
the awareness that the existing structures have been 
ineffective and had begun to exist without any appreciable 
number of citizens in support of their respective 
movements." 73 Using the ideology of the Congress for 
Racial Equality (CORE), Martin Luther King, and Gandhi, 
they set out to make changes in Omaha. In their five 
paragraph, 364 word statement, they informed local blacks 
that "no longer should we spend our money where we cannot
70“NAACP Meeting Information Still Leaks Out,” Omaha Star, May 10, 1963.
7l“Ebony Article Declares: “Negro Has New Mood,” Omaha Star, June 28, 1963.
72Nick Kotz, “More Jobs in Omaha Firms for Negroes,” Des Moines Sun Register, reprinted in 
Omaha Star, August 30, 1963.
73 Ibid.
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work. . . We have waited too long for the things which are
rightfully ours to be handed us on a 'piece-meal' basis."74
4CL's list of demands was similar to the persistent 
demands of other organizations and included fair 
employment, better housing, and access to public 
accommodations. They also asked for equal police 
protection, distribution of black teachers throughout the 
city, particularly in high schools, and a black head "OF 
OUR CHOOSING" on the Human Relations Board.75 Mayor James 
J. Dworak maintained a less than favorable opinion of 4CL: 
"As far as I am concerned the 4CL is non-existent. I 
haven't even heard of them. They are not recognized by me 
or my office."76
The lack of municipal recognition did not deter the 
organization; the 4CL trained their "storm troopers" in 
simple procedures for testing accommodations. After being 
refused service for a second time, 4CL members were 
instructed to call the police. If a black person was forced 
to pay a cover charge, they were to determine whether a 
cover was required from all patrons. If not, they were to 
contact the police. if the owner of a club stated that you
74“4CL Schedules Meeting; Issues Purpose Statement,” Omaha Star, June 21, 1963.
75“At Noon Friday 4CL Has No Contact with Dworak,” Omaha Star, June 28, 1963.
76“Dworak: Will Not Keep 4CL Pledge,” Omaha Star, August 30, 1963.
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were too drunk to enter, call the police and have them 
determine whether or not you were drunk. Finally if the 
police department did not cooperate, 4CL activists were 
instructed to call Reverend McNair or Reverend Jones.77
The organization had outstanding success. They 
marched silently outside four Safeway stores with placards 
reading "We Want Jobs Now." The company gave in allowing 
the leaders to make an agreement with Safeway to add 
thirty-five jobs within forty-five days and an additional 
thirty-five jobs within ninety days. S.S. Kresge Company 
hired eight black workers after a two-day demonstration by 
4CL. Hinky Dinky pledged to hire thirty more blacks in 
sixty days and Schimmel's Indian Hills Inn workers received 
a wage increase. What 4CL is best known for is its 
picketing of the popular Peony Park. In their first 
attempt, the owner of the amusement park closed the door. 
After the second attempt the owner turned the park into a 
private club. Finally on 4CL's third attempt to integrate 
Peony Park, the owner stopped fighting, and allowed the 
protesters to enter.78
77“Procedures Listing for Testing Accommodation Laws,” Omaha Star, September 4, 1964.
78 Nick Kotz, “More Jobs in Omaha Firms for Negroes,” Des Moines Sun Register, reprinted in 
Omaha Star, August 30, 1963.
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4CL had a wide appeal. They were able to gather a 
large number of protesters at City Hall to show support for 
an open occupancy housing ordinance, In front of city 
hall, 4CL staged a silent demonstration devoid of chants, 
songs, and slogans. In attendance were between four and 
five hundred school-age children. Also present were two to 
four thousand adults including members of the NAACP, the 
Urban League, the Urban League Guild, the Catholic 
Interracial Council, the Anti-Defamation league, the Black 
Muslims, the Mayor's Bi-Racial Council, as well as Elks, 
Masons, Eastern Stars, African Methodist Episcopalians, 
Baptists, Methodists, and Catholics.79
In spite of moderate success in integrating stores and 
places of recreation, groups such as 4CL, the Urban League 
and the NAACP had difficulty convincing the municipal 
government of the need for more significant changes in the 
average black Omahan's life. Omaha in the 1960s, then, 
becomes the story not of the success of non-violent direct 
action but of the anger and disenfranchisement that
79“2,000 Show Negro Power in Quiet City Hall Protest,” Omaha Warid-Herald, October 30, 1963. 
There is some discrepancy in reporting between the Omaha World-Herald and the Omaha Star. The 
Omaha Star reported that “four thousand freedom loving Negroes and 150 sympathetic whites” were 
present. “Four Thousand Stand-in for Open Occupancy Laws,” Omaha Star, October 31, 1963.
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remained. These frustrations ushered in the age of urban 
violence in Omaha.
9
32
CHAPTER TWO 
THE RIOT OF 1966
In 1966, three years after the peaceful March on 
Washington and one year before the Summer of Love, the 
United States witnessed forty-three riots. These 
disturbances spanned coast to coast, in Watts and Chicago, 
Cleveland.and Baltimore, most often incited by an incident 
between a police officer and a black citizen.1 That July, 
in the midst of a local heat wave, Omahans tasted the 
racial chaos sweeping the nationJ
The first manifestation of these explosive events 
occurred over the Fourth of July weekend in 1966. Late 
Saturday evening on July 2, a large group of from 100 to 
200 black youths, lacking recreational activities, loitered 
•in a parking lot. This property belonged to the Safeway 
Grocery and Skaggs Drugstore.3 It lay in the heart o f 'the 
black community, and in the minds of many black Omahans, at
'National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders, Executive Order 11365, March, 1968, 21. Hereafter referred to as the Kemer 
Commission.
2“10 Cities Report 100-Degree Highs,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
3 This was the scene of all of Omaha’s riots in the 1960s. In 1963 Safeway’s rezoning request was 
honored which allowed the rezoning of twenty-three parcels of land stretching from Lake to Ohio streets 
along Twenty-Fourth Street. The building of this store was met with “unanimous opinion that this is a 
good thing.” The new building would become the biggest Safeway in Omaha and would increase 
employment, stimulate the economy and most importantly, provide a twenty-thousand square foot parking 
lot with room for 125 cars which would allow for “the availability of off-street parking in the store’s lots 
after hours.” “Safeway Rezone Request Held,” Omaha Star, February 8, 1963.
33
the heart of their problems.4 Long criticized for price 
gouging and unfair hiring practices, Safeway and Skaggs, 
stood in the middle of the Near North Side, a constant 
reminder of racial oppression.5
At 12:49 a.m. on July 3 a neighborhood woman called 
the police because a group of teenagers was lighting 
fireworks in the parking lot.6 Two policemen driving in 
patrol cruiser #33 arrived at the scene to investigate, and 
the bored and probably frustrated teenagers threw rocks at 
the patrol car breaking the rear window. The youths then 
proceeded to hurl cherry bombs at the officers.7 Feeling 
threatened, the officers left the scene returning later 
with reinforcements. Violence began at 1:00 a.m. as reports 
of police brutality began to circulate among the crowd.8 
The youths became angrier and more confrontational towards 
the officers. At any other time such actions might have 
been attributed to teenagers letting off steam, but in the
4 This parking lot was known not only as a hangout but also as place for drug deals and* gambling. 
The police had known of this for quite some time and “either tum[ed] a deaf ear or accepted] payoffs” 
until somebody higher up wanted a stop put to it. David Rice, interview by Alonzo Smith, September 23, 
1982, transcript, Nebraska Black Oral History Project, Nebraska Historical Society, Lincoln, NE. Hereafter 
referred to as David Rice interview. f
5 Marvin McClarty of Omaha, interview by author, November 15, 2005. Hereafter referred to as 
Marvin McClarty interview.
6“Extra Police on Duty in Wake of Near Riot,” Omaha World-Herald, July 4, 1966. •
7 Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 204; “Extra Police on Duty in Wake of Near Riot,” Omaha World- 
Herald, July 4, 1966.
8 “Violence Erupts Third Straight Night,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966. There is no 
evidence to support the claim of police brutality.
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sixties, perceptions were skewed by the growing violence 
throughout the nation.9
The group began to disperse from the parking lot and 
poured onto the main business strip of the Near North Side. 
Their pent up anger, frustration, and helplessness 
manifested itself in fires and shattered glass along North 
Twenty-Fourth. Police gathered at a make-shift response 
post housed at a fire station located on Twenty-Second and 
Lake Streets. One hundred police and state troopers 
reported to the Safeway parking lot, and the youth began 
throwing rocks, bottles and stones "in the general 
direction of officers" according to Police Captain Monroe 
Coleman.10 Only minor injuries occurred save one fifteen 
year old, Aaron Hall, who was shot in the leg by the police 
while fleeing the scene.11 This general lawlessness and 
vandalism continued throughout the weekend and crowds 
continued to threaten police entering the Near North Side.
At 12:30 a.m. on July 5, 100 police officers and state 
troopers moved to the Twenty-Fourth and Lake Street area to
9 Larsen and Cottrell, The Gate City, 273. Over this same weekend between 200 and 400 youth 
threw rocks at police officers in a predominately black neighborhood in Des Moines. “Crowd Throws 
Rocks at Police, None Injured,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
10 “Violence Erupts” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
11 “Guards Used After 3rd Night of Violence,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966; “4 Policemen 
and Unknown Number of Civilians Injured,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
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disperse yet another crowd that had gathered. Recognizing 
they were undermanned, the police immediately requested 
National Guard assistance.12 Under the command of Brigadier 
General William Bachman, the First battalion, 134th 
infantry, and the 867th Engineer Company, had been assembled 
at the armory at Sixty-Ninth and Mercy Streets.13 These 
Nebraskan men, many not much older than the rioters, were 
armed with rifles, billy clubs and gas masks and were 
prepared for action. Four additional companies of the 
National Guard, totaling five hundred men, remained on 
stand-by at the armory.
Bachman's forty-four troops left the armory at 1:10 
a.m., arriving at Twenty-Fourth and. Maple Streets at 1:40 
a.m.14 The crowd teased the Guard with cat calls of 
"whitey" and encouraged them to "come and get us you white 
bitches."15 However there was no physical confrontation 
because most of the troublemakers had dispersed by then.16 
For the rioting youth, it was one thing to taunt the police 
and another to face the National Guard with bayonets and
12“Mob Tosses Bottles but Few Injured,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
13 “Police Arrest 78 Adults, 44 Juveniles on North $ide,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966; 
“HQ, Engineering Guards 1st to Get Call for Duty,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966
14 “Violence Erupts,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
15 “Guard Finds Streets Quiet but Tense,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
16At the height o f the disturbance there were four thousand people at the intersection of Twenty- 
Fourth and Lake Streets. “Violence Erupts,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
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guns.17 Mayor Sorensen decided to keep the police and 128 
Nebraskan National guardsmen on alert to break up any 
groups congregating on the corner of Twenty-Fourth and Lake 
until Thursday.18
Bringing in the National Guard seemed to help control 
the problem of riots, but the Urban League and NAACP, 
expressed their wish that the mayor would have consulted 
them prior to calling in the troops.19 An afternoon shower 
washed away some of the oppressive heat of the previous 
days and helped cool tempers on Tuesday, but the rains 
could not wash away the memory of what happened.20 Both 
Mayor A.V. Sorensen and Governor Frank Morrison agreed that 
the "conditions in Negro residential areas [led] to 
lawlessness and tension."21 Generally speaking, the 
consensus that the riot was not racially motivated 
initially led those in power to neglect the deeper 
sociological problems.22 Francis Lynch, Public Safety 
Director for Omaha, and a former FBI agent, stated that the 
feelings behind the riot followed this mentality: "The
17 Larsen and Contrell, 273.
18 “Police Arrest 78 Adults, 44 Juveniles on North Side,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966. 
"Flew Home to Help End Disturbances,” Omaha World-Herald, July 6,1966.
19Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 205.
20 “Officers Get Guard Help in Disorder,” Omaha World-Herald, July 6, 1966.
21 “Police Arrest,” Omaha World-Herald, July, 5 1966.
22 Larsen and Coltrell, Gate City, 213.
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first night it was just the cops. The second night it was 
the damn white cops and the third night it was all the 
white S.O.B.'s."23 No longer was the enemy discrimination; 
it was the white man.
At the invitation of YMCA Director, Sam Cornelius, 
Mayor Sorensen, Public Safety Director Lynch, Coordinator 
of Public/Community Relations L.K. Smith, and one hundred
24 •young black men met at the . North Side YMCA. This upset 
the NAACP who charged that Sorensen and Governor Morrison 
were listening too much to the youngsters and not enough to 
the established leadership in the black community.25 
Moreover twelve moderate leaders were also greatly incensed 
over information which was later published in the Omaha 
Star. The newspaper reported that while the older leaders 
were kept waiting for a scheduled meeting with Sorensen, 
the Mayor Was in fact "hammering out recreation and job 
providing plans with a committee of the youngsters at a 
secret meeting in the Sheraton-Fontenelle Hotel."26
The young blacks aired grievances about police 
brutality, joblessness, and the lack of recreational
23 Dalstrom, A.V. Sorensen, 205.
24Prior to the riots, A.V. Sorensen stated that blacks would make more rapid progress if they got 
together and decided what they wanted. Larsen and Coltrell, Gate City, 272.
25“Labor Dept. Open North Omaha Office Today,” Omaha World-Herald, July 9, 1966.
26“More Apps. Than Placement Orders,” Omaha Star, July 15, 1966.
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activities, and the municipal leaders listened intently.27 
The meeting was deemed a success and Sorensen was eager to 
meet again with the youth at anytime, day or night. Mayor 
Sorensen felt that there were two ways to deal with riots. 
The first was "as some cities have done with tear gas and 
machine guns" which creates "an atmosphere of antagonism 
and hatred" or by dealing with the people involved. 
Additionally, he agreed that Omaha's civil rights problems 
could be solved "if every citizen, Negro and white, will 
accept his personal.responsibility."29
By the next day, the young leaders had developed a 
list of demands. They requested more educational training 
facilities, more recreational outlets, the immediate end to 
police brutality and abuses, more jobs, and the release of 
youths jailed in the disturbance.30 Police had taken 122
27For these young politically conscious activists, police brutality meant more than just being 
roughed up by a uniformed cop. It meant the constant agitation and disrespect of white police officers.
“We Demand Rights Now,” Dundee-West Omaha Sun, March 3, 1966; “Police Arrest,” Omaha World- 
Herald, July 5, 1966.
28 “Youth Tell Grievances,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966. There was some speculation on 
the intent o f A.V. Sorensen’s actions earlier in his career. Prior to becoming mayor he helped build the 
Gene Eppley Boys’ Club in North Omaha in 1962 with a personal donation of $25,OCX). Many black 
citizens felt the establishment of the organization on the Near North Side was merely a campaign ploy. 
Sorensen responded that those comments hurt him deeply and that he could have been elected without the 
black vote. Proving his devotion to the Boys’ Club, during his time in office from 1965 until 1969,
Sorensen donated his mayoral salary of $17,500 to the Near North Side organization. As a testament to the 
importance of this organization throughout all o f the disturbances the Omaha Boys’ Club was never 
damaged. Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 119-127.
29“Mayor D_________ ling of Riots; Calls for More Action, Less Meetings,” Omaha Star, July 22,
1966. Title partially obscured on microfilm.
30 “New'demands after Tuesday Meeting '''Omaha World-Herald, July 6, 1966.
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persons in connection with the north side incidents; of 
that number, six were women. Charges for those arrested 
ranged from disturbing the peace to disobeying a police 
officer, and also included unlawful assembly, malicious 
destruction of property, fireworks violations, and 
vagrancy.31 A number of charges were dropped due to the 
belief that many of the accused may have simply been in the 
area of the disturbance while not actually violating the 
law.32
The "fixes" that the municipal government established 
to address the rioters demands could be divided into three 
categories: police relations, recreational activities, and 
job training. The first program addressed the problem of 
both recreation and police familiarity. A Blue-Ribbon 
Committee, appointed by. Mayor Sorensen, focused on the 
notion of creating better youth-police relations. One 
dramatic initiative funded by both the city and private 
organizations was a camping program held at the YMCA camp 
in Columbus, Nebraska, located eighty-two miles northeast 
of Omaha, where officers and Near North Side teens could 
interact.
31 “Police Arrest,” Omaha World-Herald July 5, 1966.
32 Dalstrom, A.V. Sorensen, 206
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In each cabin eight teens and two officers enjoyed 
what the outdoors and positive interactions had to. offer. 
Beat cops and youth fished, rode horses, and watched movies 
together for eight weeks. This helped the youth see the 
police in roles other than authoritarian figures, and gave 
the police .eyes and ears in the community. Many 
participants described this experience as one of the best 
in their lives. The bond created in Columbus facilitated 
officers in performing their duties on the street and gave 
teenagers an adult they could trust. These excursions were 
not a complete success however. Although A.V. Sorensen 
believed strongly in this program, the police department 
held a different perspective. This top-down initiative_did 
not impress Chief of Police Richard R. Anderson, and 
officers who went on the trips often came back to find that 
their beats had been reassigned. This unique and short­
lived program was perceived by some members of the police 
force as "cuddling criminals" instead of the "community 
policing" it was intended to be.33
There was also a joint effort between the city 
Department of Parks, Recreation and Public Property and the 
Omaha Public Schools to create a Police Athletic League. It
33 Marvin McClarty interview.
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was offered at the inner-city, predominately African- 
American schools of Horace Mann, Conestoga, Mason, and 
Indian Hills.34 Through this venue youth intermingled with 
the police in a competitive, but non-threatening manner.
St. Louis Cardinal pitcher and Omaha native, Bob Gibson, 
helped in the baseball league. Operation Summertime also 
sponsored basketball clinics in the Near North Side in July 
for junior high and older boys. They were to be instructed 
by Bob Boozer, another local Omahan, professional 
basketball player, and two-time all American.35
In total, Operation Summertime sponsored five 
additional new programs, including dances every night 
except Mondays and Wednesdays at the Elks Hall, the 
basketball clinics at the Near North YMCA with an outdoor 
basketball league to follow. A teenage hire out service 
also operated out of the Y ; a teen lounge and an 
information center were based at the North Christ Child 
Center.36
The fifty member "blue-ribbon" committee offered both 
short and long-term fixes to improve recreation problems. 
The panel recommended that within two months there should
34Ibid.
35“Basketball Clinics Start Monday,” Omaha Star, July 15, 1966.
36“Announce 5 New Summertime Youth Projects,” Omaha Star, July 22, 1966.
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be an increase in playground equipment and a better 
recruitment drive for the Boys' Club. Within two years a 
swimming pool and tennis courts were to be built in the 
immediate area. Finally the committee suggested that by 
the end of 1971 the Near North Side should have one major 
park and twenty smaller recreational areas. The total 
renovation would cost in excess of six million dollars.37 
Other suggestions included more "vest-pocket" playgrounds 
in vacant lots, converting the Safeway parking lot for 
community uses, and increasing the frequency in which play 
mobiles visited the area.38 Community input ranged from 
expanding the operational hours of the Boys' Club, 
developing Adams Park into an area with picnic spaces, a 
playground, a golf putting range, a swimming pool and re­
opening recreation facilities in the federal housing
• 39 •projects. Bertha Calloway's observation was probably 
shared by many in both the black and white communities: "It
37 Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 210
38Woodson Howe, “21 at Initial Hearing on Near North Side,” Omaha World-Herald, July 19,
1966.
39“Mayor D_______ ling of Riots,” Omaha Star, July 22, 1966. When the Logan=Fontcncllc
Housing Project was first built, the large recreation rooms were complete with kitchens, sinks, utensils, 
refrigerators and ranges. There was also a coatroom, toilet, office, and small storeroom available. The 
room was also provided with 100 folding chairs, twenty-five card tables, a piano, adult and children’s 
games, and two full-time activity directors. In the late 1930s Tuesday and Fridays were reserved as adult 
nights in which a tenant would host a party. Laura M. Heacock, “Social Significance o f Public Hosing with 
Special Emphasis on North Side Project” (master’s thesis, Municipal University of Omaha, 1938), 49.
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is too bad the ridiculous had to happen before the obvious 
was made known."40
Additionally, five neighborhood teens were hired to 
inform other teenagers about activities occurring between 
4:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. Sorensen also created the Mayor's 
Patrol. This group, comprised of young black men between 
the ages of nineteen and twenty-nine, maintained order in 
the Safeway parking lot. The group's name was somewhat 
misleading in that local Near North business men paid the 
salaries.41
Student municipal workers cleaned the Kountze Park 
area, and later an outdoor league sponsored games on the 
basketball courts.42 The city also decided to open a play 
lot with a $500 grant secured by Charles Washington and 
Norman Hahn from an "unnamed industry." Created by the 
newly founded People's Recreational Council, the park was 
located at Twenty-Eighth and Grant Streets and featured a 
slide, teeter-totters, swings, and merry-go-rounds.43
Charles M. Christiansen, Director of Parks and 
Recreation and Public Property, requested that the 1967
40 Howe, “21 at Initial Hearing on Near North Side.”
41 Dalstrom , A.V. Sorensen, 206.
42 “City Must Keep Commitment, Says Cornelius,” Omaha Star, July 8, 1966.
43“Announce 5 New Summertime Youth Projects,” Omaha Star, July 22, 1966.
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budget be $2,070,468, an increase of $139,796. His request 
included $293,148 for recreation compared to the $31,530 
allocated in 1966 and $222,942 for other needs compared to 
the $38,444 available in 1966. These funds would be used 
to create a second summer day camp at Fontenelle Forest.
In 1966 the Hummel Day Camp was filled to capacity with
. 4 42,500 campers an hour after applications were accepted.
In addition to these programs the city opened a 
teenage center on the Near North Side located at the 
Blackburn building at 4514 North Twenty-Fourth Street.
After the Blackburn center re-opened on July 9, it 
attracted an average of 524 patrons per night.45 The Boys' 
Club extended its hours until 10:30 p.m. and now remained 
open six days a week.46
Of the people arrested during the riots, twenty-four 
of seventy-eight were, unemployed.47 More employment 
opportunities meant less restlessness and a greater feeling 
of social satisfaction; training programs were needed to 
obtain employment.48 Riots in Chicago, Cleveland, and 
Philadelphia brought immediate federal money to the
^ “Recreation is Forgotten,” Omaha World-Herald July 27, 1966.
45 “City Opening New Teenage Center on the North Side.” Omaha World-Herald, July 9, 1966.
46“Basketball Clinics Start Monday,” Omaha Star, July 15, 1966.
47 “Police Arrest,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
48 “Programming Needs for Average Negro John Doe,” Omaha Star, October 25, 1965.
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stricken area. Omaha had to lobby in order to obtain the 
same funds. Sorensen convinced the federal Office of 
Economic Opportunity to double the yearly Job Corps 
Allocation in Omaha.49 He then used this money to establish 
programs to offer job skills to the "average negro John 
Doe."50 Government and community officials also encouraged 
all unemployed blacks to register with Sam Cornelius so, as 
Sorensen stated, that the city can "use our energies to put 
the man and the job together." Phillip C. Sorensen, 
Lieutenant Governor, headed a six man committee to set up a 
state employment office to take inventory of human 
resources.51 Committee members included Mayor Sorensen, 
Donald Peterman, Lambert Eitel, Senator Edward Danner, and 
Paul Miller.52
Cornelius, who also served as chairman of United 
Community Service project (UCS), oversaw Operation 
Sunshine, a job training organization which enabled several 
youth to receive jobs at the South Omaha Sewage Treatment 
Plant. Thirteen others worked for the Omaha Public 
Schools. On average the teenagers' wages ranged between
49 Dalstrom, A.V. Sorensen, 211.
50 Woodson Howe, “Rec. Groups Hears Needs,” Omaha World-Herald, July 21, 1966.
51 Lieutenant Governor Sorensen is no relation to Mayor Sorensen.
52 “Officers Get Guard Help in Disorder,” Omaha World-Herald, July, 6, 1966.
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$1.07 and $1.42 an hour, considered good pay for the time.53 
The city also hired over 200 blacks in municipal jobs.54
The Paxton Hotel was opened as the downtown site of 
the over eighty-five job training centers throughout the 
city.55 The job training center at the Paxton was a mixed 
success, however, because the presence of so many young 
black males and females frightened area shoppers and led to 
complaints from the business community.56 The Job Corps 
site expanded and the Office of Economic Opportunity 
awarded the Burroughs Corporation a partially funded 
contract for $2,110,977 to expand the Omaha Women's Job 
Corps Center. This allowed the Paxton Hotel to accommodate 
465 more Job Corps women. At the Regis Hotel, a training 
center in operation since June 29, 1965, served 335 women. 
The Omaha center was the first women's Job Corps Center to 
expand. The Paxton site was picked because it was cost 
efficient and was in close proximity to the first site.57 
The Labor Department of Nebraska also established a North 
Omaha office on July 7 that was open seven days a week.58
53 “July 4 Disturbances Leaders Sum It Up,” North Omaha Sun, July 14, 1966.
54 “Q ty s ig ns 200 Negro Applicants,” Omuhu World-Herald, July 8, 1966.
55 “Job Crops Center to Expand,” Omaha Star, July 8, 1966.
56 Larsen and Coltrell, Gate City, 255.
57 “Job Corps Center to Expand,” Omaha Star, July 8, 1966.
58 Larsen and Coltrell, Gate City, 274.
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Unfortunately these job measures were not as effective as 
they could have been. Only one out of every three 
applicants was placed in a position.59
As money was flowing to meet the demands of the 
rioters, it was also moving to arm the police department in 
the event of another riot. The Wednesday following the 
first disturbance, the police ordered 250 white fiberglass 
helmets at four dollars each, increasing their stock to 
350. The new helmets could withstand being hit with 
projectiles but were not as sturdy as motorcycle helmets. 
Additionally, 200 military gas masks were ordered to 
replace 108 World War II canister style masks.60
The landscape of North Twenty-Fourth Street had 
changed dramatically. Over the course of the weekend 
twenty businesses in the Near North Side reported broken 
windows, eleven of which involved burglaries.61 The 
following week the area of Twenty-Fourth and Lake looked 
like a ghost town due to all of the boarded up store 
windows.62 Before the riot, white people felt comfortable 
going to the Near North Side; now they avoided the area.
59“Morc Apps. Than Placement Orders,” Omaha Star, July 15, 1966.
60 “Police Ordering Helmets, Mask,” Omaha World-Herald , July 6, 1966.
61 “Police Arrest,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
62 “Discouraged North Side Business Man: Had Enough I Quit,” Omaha World-Herald, August 2,
1966.
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The owner of a printing company lost 80% of his white 
clientele over the next month and planned to move out of 
the area. A Near North Side cafe lo3t 50% of its business. 
Jazz at Allen's showcase saw a 30% drop in attendance. 
Almost every business had to let go staff, and insurance 
rates skyrocketed, increasing between 40% and 60%, so that 
many owners needed federal insurance to supplement their 
policies. Other insurance companies said they were no 
longer able to write policies for the area, while some
X/
agents cancelled their clients' policies. Over the next 
year property values decreased between 20% and 40% and the 
landscape became marred with metal grills on the windows of 
once lively storefronts.63 ■ Skaggs management, in Salt Lake 
City, decided to close their drugstore located on Twenty- 
Fourth and Lake Streets causing twenty-five blacks to lose 
their jobs.64 During the disturbance Wilson Schollman sat in 
front of his hardware store at 4112 North Twenty-Fourth 
Street with a rifle. Following the riots he decided to 
brick over his store front and become a wholesaler.65 One
63 “Board Fronts Show Sickness in Near North,” Omaha World-Herald, April 30, 1967.
64 Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 210.
65 “Police Arrest,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
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banker told a World-Herald reporter that "You're crazy as 
hell to start business down there!"66
At 2:00 a.m. on one of the destructive nights during 
the July 1966 riots, a black man sought out a World-Herald
reporter to ensure his voice was heard: "I want to tell
everyone that it isn't the whole Negro community causing
the trouble. "67 Most of the rioters were troublemakers,
wayward youngsters with nothing to do. Of the nearly 
30,000 African-Americans living in Omaha at the time, only 
200 participated in the riots, less than one percent of the 
population. Sorensen acknowledged the "literally hundreds 
of residents" that did not participate and "continue[d] 
this fine expression of responsibility."68 Regardless of 
who or how many perpetrators there were, these destructive 
actions became a reflection on the entire community.69 
Before the riots, Omaha whites thought that blacks were 
reasonable people who could find peaceful compromises, but 
the riots deepened the racial divide.70
In the years prior to the first riot of 1966, many 
Omahans thought the Urban League and NAACP spoke for blacks
66 “Board Fronts Show Sickness in Near North,” Omaha World-Herald, April 30, 1967.
67“Not Whole Community,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
68 “Police Arrest,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
69 “Not Whole Community,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
70 Larsen and Coltrell, The Gate City, 272.
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at large, but in fact they represented a more middle class, 
conservative constituency. The 1964 Civil Rights Act which 
so many had fought and died for had little local effect 
except to end overt discrimination. As the idea of
V .
integration began to lose popularity among black youth, so 
did these more conservative groups. 4CL invited Malcolm X 
to speak in June 1964 on "A Warning to White America."71 He 
told the crowd of over four hundred, "it's time to start 
swinging. The only thing that stops a man with a shotgun 
is another man with a shotgun."72
Although this change in mentality and strategy caught 
many, both black and white, by surprise, the sentiment had 
long been festering. The Omaha Star reported that an 
article in Ebony magazine stated that the "Negro has [a] 
new mood," that the growing militancy is because of the 
slow pace of desegregation and a newly discovered "negro 
pride."73 As early as 1964, Mayor James J. Dworak speculated 
riots in Omaha were possible because the City Council 
"waved a red cape" in front of militant civil rights groups
71“4CL Explains Malcolm X,” Omaha World-Herald, June 21, 1964.
72“MalcoIm X Declares Anything Whites Do Blacks Can Do Better,” Omaha World-Herald, July 
1, 1964. There is some discrepancy as to Malcolm X ’s exact quote. The Omaha Star newspaper reported it 
as “A man with a rifle or club can only be stopped by a person who defends himself with a rifle or club.” 
“Negro Must Prepare to Defend Himself or Continue at the Mercy of Racist Mobs,” Omaha Star, July 3, 
1964.
73“Ebony Article Declared ‘Negro Has New Mood,’” Omaha Star, June 28, 1963.
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over the open housing issue.74 Dworak noted that riots had 
occurred in Rochester, New York, a community similar in 
size and racial composition to Omaha.75 Whitney Young, who 
headed the Omaha Urban League from 1950 until 1954, urged 
in a 1963 speech to the Omaha Chamber of Commerce that the 
city's power structure needed to "deal with" Reverends 
Kelsey Jones and R.E. McNair of 4CL. He felt that failure 
to do so would result in the coming to the forefront "of 
some waiting in the wings whose methods are more radical 
than those who are now calling attention to the ills and 
evils of discrimination currently hurting the entire 
community."76 By December 19 65, Norman L. Hahn of the Human 
Relations Board stated, "Omaha has a very explosive 
situation. I think any form of self-delusion is dangerous 
as hell."77
A March 1966 article in the Dundee-West Omaha Sun by 
"local militant" leader Ernie Chambers, said "a bomb is the 
only answer. Someone will have to blow up downtown Omaha 
to convince the white power structure that we mean 
business, that we are damn' sick of imprisonment in this
74 Woodson Howe, “Extremists Might Tum to Disorders,” Omaha World-Herald, April 30, 1964.
75“N o  Harlem Wanted Here,” Omaha World-Herald, July 29, 1964.
76“Those Waiting in the Wings Came,” Omaha Star, July 8, 1966.
77 Dalstrom, A. V. Sorensen, 200.
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stinking ghetto." When asked if a Martin Luther -King, Jr. 
style protest would be effective in Omaha, he replied "no, 
there is not enough non-violen[ce] left in Omaha Negroes to 
support such an effort." 78 How had Omaha become a city 
where non-violent direct action in the style of King had 
been rendered ineffective? Why were increasing numbers of 
black leaders drawn to more militant and confrontational 
tactics?
The answer for many was quite simple. While the 
traditional outlets for change had made little headway, the 
riot of 1966 brought drastic and rapid changes. The most 
glaring example of this occurred in the implementation of 
the state employment office on the Near North Side. The 
office established as a satellite, was originally requested 
by the Urban League in 1964. What had taken "respectable" 
entities two years of unsuccessful lobbying, took a group 
of teenage hoodlums a mere weekend to achieve. Within the 
week the Near North Side had their new employment office.
The Governor's Commission on Human Rights said that 
the local government should have acted before the riots. 
Pete Lakers from Columbus, the chairman of the commission, 
stated that:
78“We Demand Rights Now,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, March 3, 1966.
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We can only conclude that Omaha and Nebraska are 
following the patterns that have been established in 
other cities and states: those persons in responsible 
positions will only listen to irresponsible leadership 
and that social reform is only possible through the 
use of violence. We deplore that such a conclusion 
must be reached and request all eleicted officials to 
bring about necessary reform so that irresponsibility 
and violence are not the proper tools for needed 
change.79
The difference between the changing of the new and old 
guard was also made apparent in the statements that each 
group released. Fourteen ministers from the Baptist 
Ministerial Alliance, Cleaves Temple Christian Methodist 
Episcopalian Church, and the Christ Temple Church released 
the following statement: "We deplore the recent acts of 
vandalism and looting and we feel further that the acts are 
unfounded . . . such uprisings only lead to the total
destruction of our community."80 Conversely, the young 
rioters saw the more established organizational leaders as 
". . . acting like the old drum major, standing on the
corner as the parade came by saying.: 'This can't be the
parade; I'm not leading it.'"81
79“Negro Need was Ignored,” Omaha World-Herald July 25, 1966. In 1963, Governor Morrison, 
when asked about the protest at Peony Park, said: “I can see no useful purpose to be served by 
demonstration of any kind, because demonstrations only inflame people and prey upon their passion rather 
then the orderly process of the law.” “Demonstrations Can Lead to No Good, Says Morrison,” Omaha 
World-Herald, July 16, 1963.
80“Fourteen Ministers Issue Appeal,” Omaha World-Herald, July 5, 1966.
8‘“More Apps. Than Placement Orders,” Omaha Star, July 15, 1966.
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In summing up the conflict, the editor of the Omaha 
Star acknowledged both viewpoints:
"We cannot commend the methods they [the rioters] used 
to draw attention to the fact that they were 
frustrated and despaired because they could not feel 
or see any appreciable betterment of their lot. 
Likewise, we cannot commend those who have failed over 
the past three years to listen to the traditional 
methods of calling attention to the fact that in Omaha 
there is discrimination in housing, education, 
employment, and health and welfare services. . . We
think that less attention should be paid to the 
methods they used in calling attention to their plight 
and more to finding some solutions to the causes which
o 2
brought their actions about."
Omaha blacks were expressing their needs, grief and 
frustrations in a new violent way. As Ernie Chambers 
predicted in a December 1965 article in the Omaha Star: "If
black men are Frankensteins, white men made them such. And 
as with the original 'monster' the mechanism for 
controlling us is rapidly failing."83
82“Those Waiting in the Wings Came,” Omaha Star, July 8, 1966.
83“A Militant Look At Black Poverty,” Omaha Star, December 30, 1966.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE 'CALM' BEFORE THE STORM
"Sandwiched between the white man's winter and the 
black man's summer is the restless interlude of spring. "
— Jack Todd1
Whereas the summer of 1967 was relatively calm in 
Omaha, the same could not be said for the rest of the 
United States. Over 150 cities reported disturbances, most 
often in black neighborhoods. The two worst came in July 
of that year with both Detroit and Newark becoming victims 
of violent and deadly riots. On July 28, 1967, while the 
streets of Detroit's black enclave still glowed red from 
the fires, Lyndon Baines Johnson established the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to answer three 
basic questions: "What happened?" "Why did it happen?" and 
"What can be done to prevent it from happening again?"2
The Commission findings although groundbreaking, for 
many black citizens reiterated what they already knew. A 
disturbance usually occurred in conjunction with long-
’jack Todd, “Omaha, 1968-The Watched Pot Begins to Boil,” Daily Nebraskan reprinted in the 
Omaha Star, April 11, 1968. The Daily Nebraskan is the University o f Nebraska at Lincoln student 
newspaper.
2National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report o f the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders, Executive Order 11365, March, 1968, 21. Hereafter referred to as the Kemer 
Commission.
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standing injustices followed by a precipitating event. The 
violence almost always flared up at night only to wane 
during the daylight hours. The long-standing injustices 
were numerous and present in every community: pervasive 
discrimination and segregation, black ghettos, frustrated 
hopes, and the new militant mood of young blacks. Despite 
the reality that all of these factors were present in 
Omaha, the summers of 1967 and 1968 remained reasonably 
quiet.
A lengthy article appeared in the Omaha World-Herald 
highlighting interviews with various members of the 
community. A reporter asked each person why they thought in 
the "long, hot summer" of 1968, Omaha did not experience 
the burnings that it did in 1966. Some thought prompt law 
enforcement reactions contributed to a quiet summer; others 
cited the positive influence of black leaders. Mayor 
Sorensen felt that black people's awareness of improvements 
and white people's changing attitudes helped the situation. 
However Sergeant Pitman Foxall of the Omaha Police 
Department Police-Community relations staff and a Near 
North Side resident was probably closest to the truth:
3 Ibid., 1-5.
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"Basically, it has been a lot of luck."4 Omahans teetered 
on the verge of their luck running out, and the events that 
occurred in the spring of 1968 should have indicated that a 
major change was looming.
The temperature in Omaha on March 3 was an 
unseasonably high sixty degrees. That Sunday former 
Alabama governor George C. Wallace arrived at Eppley 
Airfield in a chartered four-engine DC-6 at 2:30 p.m.5 
Outside the terminal, orderly demonstrators chanted "Sock 
it to me, Black Power!" The Omaha Police Department guessed 
that over 1,500 people had gathered to either welcome or 
denounce Wallace. Both groups vigorously pumped signs in 
the air ranging from "Wallace Go Home" to "Welcome to 
Nebraska," from "Anarchy in the Streets is from Racism in 
the States" to "We Conservatives Must Stick Together." 6 
Clearly Omaha had two very distinct opinions of Wallace.
Richard Marvel, a professor of political science at 
the University of Omaha, invited Wallace to speak to his 
class the following day.7 Marvel instructed his class, "be 
prepared to discuss chapter one of Rossiter. If you have
4 ‘“Hot Summer’ Over, And the City Looks Ahead,” Omaha World-Herald, September 9, 1968.
5John Taylor, “Predicts He’ll Gain Support for 3d Party,” Omaha World-Herald, March 3, 1968.
6“Fans and Foes Greet Wallace in Nebraska,” Omaha World-Herald, March 4, 1968.
7“Weather, Racial Woes Both Heat Up,” Dundee West-Omaha Sun, March 7, 1968.
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not gone over your reference material, I suggest you do 
so."8 With those simple words of introduction Wallace took 
the stage and addressed the class; no questions were 
allowed. By 1:30 p.m. five hundred students and other 
protestors stood in the university's parking lot voicing 
their opinion of Wallace with cries of "Ungowah, Black 
Power!" filling the air.9 Signs of protest were raised high 
in the air decrying, "Burn Bigot Burn," "Let Me Go to Jail 
and Wallace Go to Hell," and "When will the Civil War 
End?"10 Wallace informed the class of his feelings toward 
the "pseudo-intellectuals" protesting outside: "If I get to 
be president and one of these anarchists lays down in front 
of my car, it will be the last one he lays under."11 A 
boisterous applause followed.
That night Nebraska voters helped Wallace form a third 
political party in Nebraska. At 6:30, an hour before his 
scheduled speech began, protestors marched in front of 
Omaha's Civic Auditorium with signs. As youths and 
Catholic nuns chanted, "We want Freedom-Send Wallace Home," 
signs bobbed up and down in the picket line proclaiming,
8“Wallace Claims Victory,” Omaha World-Herald, March 5, 1968.
9“A Day of Stupidity,” Gateway (Omaha), March 8, 1968. This is the University o f Omaha’s 
student newspaper.
10“Turmoil Marks Wallace Party Meeting,” Omaha World-Herald, March 5, 1968.
"“Candidate Wallace at Omaha University,” Gateway (Omaha), March 8, 1968.
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"Wallace is A Putz," "Racism is Unchristian," "What Color 
is God, Governor?" "White Fascism," "LSW-Lord Save me from 
Wallace," "Pseudo Intellectuals of the World Unite," 
"Racists Go Home," "Wallaceness is Lawlessness" and "Black 
is Back. "12
Organized by the leaders of Near North Side 
neighborhood associations and several Omaha priests 
including F r . Jack McCaslin, the protest included black 
Creighton students, Holy Family parishioners, and high 
school kids who "latched on it."13 What happened next was 
described by F r . McCaslin as a "police-induced riot." 
Officers dressed in black shirts led the high school 
protesters who were marching outside into the auditorium to 
a reserved section immediately adjacent to the stage where 
Wallace was set to speak. When the adult marchers came up 
to the entrance, the police told the chaperones that the 
reserved section was full. The officers directed them to 
sit in the balcony. After staying there only a few minutes 
before Wallace spoke, McCaslin looked over at fellow priest 
John Krejci and stated, "Do you want to hear that fool 
speak? Let's go home." As the two priests left, they
,2‘Turmoil Marks Wallace Party Meeting,” Omaha World-Herald, March 5, 1968.
13John (Jack) McCaslin of Omaha, interview by author, Omaha, NE, December 14, 2005. 
Hereafter referred to as Fr. Jack McCaslin interview.
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passed what McCaslin described as the most scared man, a 
police officer, he had ever seen.14
Inside, the convention went on. Forty-two roster 
clerks sat taking names of people registering for the 
American Party. The new party supporters were white and 
most were well-dressed, patient and mature. Henry Bucklew, 
mayor of Laurel, Mississippi strode up to the podium and 
declared: "In seven and a half minutes Nebraska has placed 
the name of George Wallace on the ballot!"15 Both pro and 
anti-Wallace factions joined in the pledge of allegiance 
and national anthem, but the demonstrators roared "with 
liberty and justice for all" and "land of the free." Then 
an unknown person released stink bombs, filling the 
auditorium with a vomit smell.16
Although the Civic Auditorium had only 1,400 seats, 
over 5,400 people had crammed inside.17 The auditorium was 
stiflingly hot; some thought that the thermostat had been
14Fr. McCaslin in his interview implied that this officer had some knowledge that a melee would 
occur later in the night. Ibid.
15Only 750 signatures were needed to put Wallace on the ballot, In Omaha the American Party 
received over 2,100. “Predicts He’ll Gain Support for 3d Party,” Omaha World-Herald, March 3, 1968; 
Larry Wilson, “Wallace Party Claims Victory,” Omaha World-Herald, March 4, 1968.
,6Dick Herman, “Melee Erupts as 2,236 Sign Petition Supporting Wallace,” Lincoln Journal-Star, 
March 5, 1968.
17 Ibid.
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intentionally set high.18 The students sitting in front 
began tearing apart their protest signs and threw them 
onstage. The students, sandwiched between the pro-Wallace 
crowd and Wallace's "goon squad" including plainclothes 
Omaha police officers , were like sitting ducks.iy When 
Wallace gave the signal, "it is people like you" and 
pointed down at the youth, the melee began.20 Police 
officer Duane Pavel sprayed young David Rice with mace.21 
Five or six fellow protestors rushed Rice out of the 
auditorium hall to rinse his eyes. Other students, had to 
run a gauntlet as they were "beaten out of the auditorium" 
with steel folding chairs.22 The police forced the 
protesters to run from the front of the auditorium down
18David Rice, interview by Alonzo N. Smith, September 23, 1982. Nebraska Black Oral History 
Project, Nebraska Historical Society, Lincoln, NE. Jack McCaslin interview.
19Fr. Jack McCaslin interview.
20Marvin McClarty o f Omaha, interview by author, Omaha, NE, November 15, 2005. Hereafter 
referred to as Martin McClarty interview. Nebraska Senator Ernest Chambers of Omaha, interview by 
author, Omaha, NE, February 20, 2006. Hereafter referred to as Sen. Ernie Chambers interview. The 
Omaha World-Herald describes the incident somewhat differently. Reporter Larry Wilson wrote that the 
“twenty-five young Negroes took a strategic position” in front of Wallace. Wallace continued to speak and 
told the audience, ‘These are the free speech folks, you know, and these are the kind of folks the people of 
this country are sick and tired of.” Police Captain Elvin Stokes then asked Palmer Anderson, age nineteen, 
to move to aside. Anderson took a swing at the officer and the “police quickly ran a flying wedge.. .like a 
Notre Dame football rush swept the dissenters the length of the Arena floor and out the door.” Larry 
Wilson, “Wallace Party Claims Victory,” Omaha World-Herald, March 4, 1968.
21In the black community Pavel was often seen as the stereotypical white racist police officer. 
Marvin McClarty interview.
22Quote from David Rice interview; Fr. Jack McCaslin interview. Two white sociology students 
from the University o f Nebraska told their version to the Omaha Star. “After Wallace’s initial attempt to 
address the audience failed, one of his aides started to deliver what appeared to be an ultimatum to the 
protestors to disperse. He was visibly stopped by Wallace. One cannot help but speculate why Wallace 
would want the situation to intensify.” Henry Camp and David Sallee, ‘The Impact and Aftermath of 
Wallace,” Omaha Star, March 14, 1968.
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the center aisle and across the back to a rear side exit. 
The spectators witnessed a black girl being kicked by two 
white males, a black boy on his hands and knees being hit 
with a chair by an older man, and a Wallace supporter 
holding a young black man while a police officer struck 
him. Two student observers felt that the incident "was 
precipitated by a lack of rational and perceptive 
forethought on the part of the Omaha police."23
Shortly after 10:00 p.m. the first reports of groups 
gathering near Twenty-Fourth and Lake Streets began. Police 
Chief Richard R. Anderson, sensing danger, held the night 
shift on duty and had the early morning shift report 
early.24 At 10:28 p.m. a large group of cars .began arriving 
at the Safeway parking lot. By 10:32 p.m. broken windows 
were reported at the Varsity Press, located on Nineteenth 
Street. A minute later the crowd on Twenty-Fourth and Lake 
Streets was estimated to be close to 200 people.25
James Abbot, a twenty-three-year old off-duty officer 
who had worked at the Civic Auditorium earlier that night, 
checked in with Central Station to see if any help was 
needed. His commanding officer assigned him to the Near
23 Ibid.
24“Disorder Reported After Wallace Rally,” Omaha World-Herald March 5, 1968.
25“Window-Breaking Started Vandalism Near 24th, Lake,” Omaha World-Herald, March 5, 1968.
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North Side with three other policemen. Shortly thereafter 
he received a radio call to report to the Crosstown Loan 
and Pawn shop. Owners Jack and John Belmont requested that 
somebody watch their store after a group of youths had 
broken the front store windows and had attempted to tear 
off the security bars.26
While Officer Abbott sat inside with his riot gun 
protecting the store, Howard Stevenson crawled through a 
broken window and started to open a sliding glass door 
granting others access to the shop. The police officer 
shouted "stop" and then shot.27 The victim was torn nearly 
in half. Abbott fired from a distance of thirty-three 
feet.28
Elsewhere the chaos escalated as firebombs were thrown 
at the Crosstown Loan Company, a barbershop, drugstore, 
wholesale company, and a private home. Six black youths 
were arrested at 11:45 p.m. at Nineteenth and Sprague
26“Why Policeman had Shotgun Explained,” Omaha World-Herald, March 7, 1968.
27“Fire Bombs are Thrown, Six Arrested,” Omaha World-Herald, March 6, 1968. Father 
McCaslin recalled years later that the other boy with Stevenson never heard the officer give any direction. 
Fr. Jack McCaslin interview. The police chief stated that he would “discuss with Officer Abbot the 
violation of our policy regarding police equipment.” It was illegal for Abbott to be in possession o f a riot 
gun while off duty, but he was never arraigned on formal charges. Douglas County Attorney Donald L. 
Knowles explained: “We feel the shooting was tragic but justifiable.” “Fire Bombs are Thrown, Six 
Arrested,” Omaha World-Herald, March 6, 1968.
28Ibid. The tragic irony of the entire situation is that these young men’s paths had crossed before in 
1966. Both Stevenson and Abbott were participants in the city’s youth-police camping experience in 
Columbus. Jack Todd, “Omaha, 1968-The Watched Pot Begins to Boil,” Daily Nebraskan, reprinted in the 
Omaha Star, April 11, 1968.
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Streets for suspicion of using firebombs. Over sixty 
community volunteers, twenty of whom were clergy, patrolled 
the Near North Side in small groups of four or five riding 
in six separate cars. Others were in touch with the home 
base at 2802 North Twenty-Fourth Street via walkie-talkie. 
They walked the streets instructing the rioting protestors 
to "cool it," but there was no way that the students would 
forget what had happened.29
As night became day the disturbances did not end, 
rather they took a new form at the predominately African- 
American schools in Omaha. The next morning, one thousand 
students walked out of 'Horace Mann Junior High School. By 
March 8, over 3,500 of the 5,700 total student population 
at Central, Tech, and North High Schools were absent.30 
White parents and moderate black parents, fearing violence, 
kept their children home.31 Those that remained in school 
wreaked havoc there.
On March 6 the chaos initiated as a Molotov cocktail 
exploded in North High School.32 Trouble at Horace Mann
29“20 Clergymen, Others Spend Night Trying to Ease Tension,” Omaha World-Herald, March 6,
1968.
30“Omaha World-Herald Centennial Series: Summer of 1966 was ‘Long, Hot’ as the Riots 
Reached Omaha,” Omaha World Herald, June 16, 1985; “Official Says 3,500 Miss Class Friday,” Omaha 
World-Herald, March 3, 1968.
3,“Only Third o f Students Present at North High,” Omaha World-Herald, March 8, 1968.
32“School Day Runs a Bit Smoother,” Omaha World-Herald, March 7, 1968.
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began at 10:04 a.m. as the bell rang for students to go to 
third hour. One-half of the one thousand students stayed 
outside of class after the bell rang. The students went 
from classroom to classroom saying "Third Hour-Riot." At 
10:30 a.m. Sacred Heart's windows were broken out by female 
students from Horace Mann. The Sacred Heart students were 
hustled to the interior hallways to prevent injuries. At 
10:45 a.m. firemen were called to extinguish bushes that 
had been lit outside of the school. They were later called 
back out to extinguish a grass fire at North High School.33 
At Technical High School a student protestor set a 
wastebasket on fire in the restroom. Simultaneously at 
12:25 p.m. Tech High students allegedly threw rocks at 
passing traffic, and Mann students tried to gain admittance 
into Lothrop and Saratoga schools.34 Ernie Chambers, who 
since the 1966 disturbance increasingly became a 
spokesperson for the disaffected youth, stood on the front 
lines trying to calm the youth, informing the Mann Junior 
High students that the media was going to make them out to 
be hoodlums. Later that day when he, Dan Goodwin, and
33 Sister Mary Danielle O.P. stated, “Our students were irate at this [breaking o f the windows].” 
Perhaps this shows the dichotomy between rich and poor in the growth of black radicalism, as the Kemer 
Commission months earlier reported.
34“Chambers Quiets Milling Pupils,” Omaha World-Herald, March 9, 1968.
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Marvin McClarty went to Tech High School, the young 
students awaited Chambers arrival expecting to receive his 
approval. But Chambers condemned their actions by saying, 
"Why did you destroy the library? The one place you 
need!"35 Officers remained at the schools until March 25, 
to prevent additional problems.36
The riot left white Omahans frightened.37 B.D. Super, 
the manager of the Hansen's Sporting Good store at 7529 
Dodge Street, stated that "I've never had such a week in
the gun business." He reported handgun sales at more than
/
three times the volume in the same period the year before. 
J.C. Penney also showed a twenty-five percent increase in
38 • •the sale of rifles and handguns. Police registration 
records in Omaha showed that four times as many owners 
registered pistols in the two weeks after Wallace spoke 
than had in a comparable period before March 4. The
35Marvin McClarty interview.
36“School Guard is Called Off at 4 Sites,” Omaha World-Herald, March 25, 1968. The schools on 
the Near North Side were plagued with many problems including high teacher turn-over rates. On average 
North High School had a seventeen percent turnover, Central High School, fourteen percent, Tech High 
School thirty-one percent, Tech Junior High forty-four percent, and Horace Mann Junior High forty-seven 
percent. In 1968 half of the teachers were new to Mann. The percentage of blacks at the four main junior 
and high schools that served the Near North Side were as follows: North High School seventeen percent, 
Central High School, eighteen percent, Tech High School, sixty-two percent, and Horace Mann Junior 
High School, ninety-seven percent. “Only Third of Students Present at North High,” Omaha World- 
Herald, March 8, 1968.
37Jack Todd, “Omaha, 1968— Watched Pot Begins to Boil,” Daily Nebraskan reprinted in Omaha 
Star, April 11, 1968.
38“Gun Dealers Report Sales On Increase,” Omaha World-Herald, March 8, 1968.
67
average daily registration before March 4 was thirteen; on 
March 4 it hit a high of fifty in one day.39
As in 1966, in addition to the emotional damaye, a 
great deal of physical damage was also inflicted on the 
city of Omaha. Following the disturbance sponsors decided 
that they needed to move the state basketball tournament 
from the Civic Auditorium in Omaha to Lincoln, resulting in 
a major loss of revenue for local businesses.40 At Horace 
Mann Junior High, it-cost $3,300 to repair the fifty-four 
windows knocked out by the students. Myrton K. Hall, 
administrative assistant for the Omaha Board of Education, 
stated that the total bill for the damage done to the 
school was $4,200. The Omaha Police Department said that 
the list for claimed damages included forty-four cars and 
thirty-two buildings, nine of which were burglarized or 
looted. It cost approximately $100 for each front 
windshield and $50 for rear windshields to be replaced.
City auditorium Manager Charles Mancuso estimated between 
$600 and $800 in damages there, and the Omaha Transit 
Corporation claimed over $500. The extra school security
39“Dangerous Folly,” Omaha World-Herald, March 18, 1968.
^ “Tourney Move Will Darken Arena,” Omaha World-Herald, March 7, 1968.
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guards, including four patrolmen and one sergeant, cost 
$500 a day.41
Business owners continued to be wary. Marvin Belzer 
of .Belzer's market located on North Twenty-Fourth Street 
stated that in having a business in that area, "you don't 
make a fortune and it's not worth losing your life."
Police offered Mr. Belzer an escort to see his business,, 
but he refused telling the officers he was "afraid to go 
down there." In total Belzer's market suffered $600 worth 
of merchandise stolen and a greater loss in terms of fire 
damage. Edward Rubach of Rubach's market stated: "I'm not
sure when I'll re-open. Life is too short." He had 
operated in that location for seventeen years and recently 
without insurance, which "was cancelled a couple of years 
ago." He lost over $2,000 worth of merchandise in beer, 
cigarettes, and food and, like Belzer, suffered major fire 
damage.42
Wallace's appearance and the riot that followed marked 
a shift in the attitudes and the level of involvement of 
many young black Omahans to a more militant and racially 
motivated commitment. Within the space of a few days, they
41 “Bills Coming for a Week o f Disorders,” Omaha World-Herald, March 8, 1968.
42“Owners of Looted Stores Not Sure They Will Re-Open,” Omaha World-Herald, April 29, 1968.
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seemed to move from the passive and peaceful philosophy of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. to the more militant, 
confrontational and race-conscious style of Stokely 
Carmichael and the Black Panthers.43
After Wallace came to Omaha friends of different races 
had a difficult time maintaining their friendships. A 
series of interviews with students at North High School 
revealed the new level of race tensions. LaWanda Mitchell, 
a senior and seventeen-year-old honors student, observed 
that "since Tuesday, if Negroes were seen with whites, they 
were called Uncle Toms." Leonard Starnes, a seventeen- 
year-old senior and Red Cross Chapter president, speculated 
that "the Negro kids might have walked out to prove Black 
Power and the white kids in retaliating, were trying to 
show White Power."44
These interracial tensions spilled into the streets. 
Shortly after 2:30 p.m. on March 7, forty white youths
43In Black Power, Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton state that, ‘The concept of Black 
Power.. .is a call for black people in this country to unite, to recognize their heritage, to build a sense of 
community. It is a call for black people to begin to define their own goals, to lead their own organizations 
and to support those organizations.” The first exhibit of Black Power was seen a year earlier at the 
University of Omaha’s 1967 homecoming game. Black students protested not directly at the white 
audience but firmly rejected the term Negro. After waiting patiently for the national anthem to conclude, 
the group of students clad in black and wearing dark sunglasses rose to sing the “Afro American National 
Anthem.” Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics o f Liberation in 
America (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 44; “OU Blacks Students Rally for Unity,” Gateway (Omaha), 
October 20, 1967.
^ “North High Students: Prejudice is Showing,” Omaha World-Herald, March 8, 1968.
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marched towards thirty black youths near Thirty-Sixth and 
Boyd Streets. Before the police arrived to disperse them, a 
tifteen-year-old white girl brandishing a shotgun ran 
toward the group of black students. She was apprehended by
* 45 •the police and returned to the care of her family. Whites 
walking through the Near North Side also began to be 
targeted. One young white man, a Near North Side resident, 
was hit with a brick suffering a concussion, extensive 
bruises, and a stolen wallet. Unlike many he refused to 
blame the assault on race-hatred. When interviewed he 
spoke of his black friends who had never thrown a brick. 
Instead he blamed the incident on hot-heads and observed:
"I guess we have them on both sides of the fence."46 But 
how many young Omaha blacks were moving to join the hot­
heads on the other side of the fence?
The assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther 
King, Jr., on April 4, triggered violence in over 120 
American cities. In total forty-six people, mostly black
45“Only Third of Students Present at North High,” Omaha World-Herald, March 8, 1968.
46Bill Billotte, “Bricks Hew; Then Mind Went Blank,” Omaha World-Herald, April 7, 1968. The 
random targeting of white pedestrians continued even in the absence of a disturbance. A July 27 article in 
the Omaha World-Herald showed that three whites had rocks thrown at their cars in North Omaha and 
received minor injuries. “Whites’ Cars Stoned on Twenty-Fourth St.,” Omaha World-Herald, July 27, 
1968.
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were killed, 3,000 were injured, and 20,000 were arrested.47 
King's death and the riots elsewhere might have been 
expected to set off a new series of confrontations in 
Omaha, but the Near North Side stayed eerily calm.
Why had the Omaha blacks not taken to the streets as 
they had a month earlier when Wallace arrived? A twenty- 
three-year-old University of Nebraska student thought that 
blacks, out of respect for Martin Luther King's ways, had 
remained non-violent. Robert K. Hill, president of the 
Mid-City Business and Professional Association suggested 
that some blacks were "shocked and wanted to restrain 
themselves until after the funeral."48 Others were still 
waiting to see if white attitudes were going'to change. One 
black woman noted that "whites are sympathizing with us 
this week" but she wondered "what will happen next week or 
next year?"49 A.V. Sorensen optimistically attributed the 
quiet to the fact that "whites are doing some sober 
thinking and the Negro leaders are speaking against 
violence. If these two lines of thought collided, a big
47CIaybome Carson, ed. Civil Rights Chronicle: The African-American Struggle fo r  Freedom  
(Lincolnwood, EL: Legacy, 2003), 344.
48Titus Fisher, “Most Rioters ‘Cool It’, Omaha Quiet for King,” Omaha World-Herald, April, 10,
1968.
49Ibid.
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5 0step would be taken to solve Omaha's racial problems." 
However Ernie Chambers stated that the assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jr., "could very well be the fir3t shot 
of a civil war."51
Although the city did not violently mourn the death of 
Martin Luther King, the arrival of Wallace cemented the 
idea in many young black minds that the police were not on 
their side and were only the henchman of racist 
institutions. Events at the end of April seemed to confirm 
their perceptions.
On April 27, Officers Duane Pavel, Richard Gillian, 
and Charles Payne pulled alongside a group of people 
playing dice. This was the second time that the officers 
had broken up this particular gathering on Twenty-Fourth 
and Franklin Streets.52 In the blink of an eye, the police 
had Carl Edward Rucker handcuffed and on the ground. They 
continued to spray him with mace while firing their riot
50Ibid.
51“Rights Activist,” Omaha World-Herald, April 5, 1968. Years later Chambers reflected that 
perhaps Omahans did not have the same affinity for Martin Luther King because they had local leaders to 
help carry the torch: Sen. Ernie Chambers interview. On April 9, the day of Martin Luther King, Ji.’s 
funeral, seventy-five percent o f the businesses on North Twenty-Fourth Street were closed. One can only 
wonder was this on account of business owner’s fear of rioting or reverence for the deceased civil rights 
leader. “Omahans Pause,” Omaha World-Herald April 9, 1968.
52“Mayor Vows Laws to Rule, Without Ifs,” Omaha World-Herald, April 29, 1968.
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guns over the head of spectators.53 Two witnesses, John 
Beasley and John Anders, stated that the police officers, 
after having forced Rucker to the ground, taunted the crowd 
to do something about it.54
Word of police brutality spread throughout the Near 
North Side and many took to the street. Jack Kupfel of 
Jack's Grocery closed his store at 6 p.m. sensing what was 
going to happen. Two and half hours later, looters set 
fire to his building. The rioting and looting continued 
for five hours. By 10:20 p.m., the situation according to 
L.K. Smith was under control.55
In addition to torching white-owned stores, rioters 
also targeted white people. The white men that were 
injured include Dennis Toeller, a gas station attendant 
beaten during a robbery and Richard O'Brien Hays who was 
beaten when a group of thugs tried to rob him and he had no
c c
money. The following night, police dispersed seventy-five 
teenagers outside of Technical High School who had 
congregated after a school function. Upset by being forced
53Pavel and Gillian had changed parties to Wallace’s American Party. “Was Week-end Rebellion 
Triggered by ‘Appropriate’ Police Action?” Omaha Star, Clippings File Douglas County Historical 
Society.
54“2 Say Police Used Excessive Force,” Omaha World-Herald, April 30, 1968; “Police Weigh 
Handbill Case,” Omaha World-Herald, April 24, 1968.
55“Looters on N. 24th Cause Heavy Damage,” Omaha World-Herald, April 28, 1968. Carl Edward 
Rucker was booked on suspicion of gambling and resisting arrest and given a $150 bond. Ibid.
56“Omaha Police Arrest 16 in Disturbances,” Lincoln Star-Joumal, April 29, 1968.
74
to move, the students broke numerous windows along Cuming 
Street from Thirty-Second to Twenty-Fourth Street.57
Police records showed that the charges for those 
arrested during the riot included three burglaries, three 
counts of bus vandalism, eleven cars struck by projectiles, 
four assaults, and one officer shot at. Fifteen police 
cruisers had also been damaged and minor fires were set at 
four burglary sites. In total, nine people were injured 
including four police officers, but only one was 
hospitalized. The worst damage occurred between Franklin 
and Clark along North Twenty Fourth Street. The National 
Guard was alerted but not called in because the disturbance 
was deemed "not serious enough." State troopers were 
called in.58
Police Chief Anderson issued an order on Sunday that 
two of the officers involved in the dice game break up no 
longer be assigned to the Near North Side. He declined to 
name the officers but everyone assumed it was Gillian and 
Pavel.59 The two officers had a long history of conflict 
with Near North Side residents. During the Wallace meeting
57“Mayor Vows Laws to Rule, Without Ifs,” Omaha World-Herald, April 29, 1968.
58John Taylor, “Glass, Food Litter Disorder Area,” Omaha World-Herald, April 28, 1968.
59The five officers involved were Duane Pavel, Richard Gillian, Larry Anthony, John Grieger and 
Donald Stepanek. “2 Policemen Off North Side Duty,” Omaha World-Herald, April 30, 1968.
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they had prominently signed the Wallace petition, and just 
days before the April 27 incident, they had been the target 
of handbills calling them racists. Eighteen black Tech 
students were arrested for distributing the handbills which 
charged that the two officers were "armed and extremely 
dangerous to black people."60 The disturbances in April 
ended with no lives lost but summer was fast approaching.61
On July 8, nearly two years after the first violent 
outburst in Omaha, two police cruisers were damaged at 
Twenty-Fourth and Lake Streets by sniper fire. This took 
many Omahans by surprise. Sniping was thought too radical 
to be a home grown tactic; rather it smacked of Detroit, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles.62 The incident began as police had 
been called to investigate a knifing and a large crowd 
gathered. Sniper fire began to whiz pass the officers 
twelve minutes after they arrived on the scene. They ceased 
their search of the only suspect arrested and the only 
person to be injured, Ike Seals, and sought protection 
behind their patrol cars. Ambulance workers refused to 
enter without a police escort so while the police ducked
60 “\y as Week-end Rebellion Triggered by ‘Appropriate’ Police Action?” Omaha Star, Clippings 
File Douglas County Historical Society; “Police Weigh Handbill Case,” Omaha World-Herald, April 24, 
1968.
61 John Taylor, “Glass, Food Litter Disorder Area,” Omaha World-Herald, April 28, 1968.
62“Coping With Snipers,” Omaha World-Herald, July 9, 1968.
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for cover, Seals ran home so that he could be transported 
to County Hospital. The sporadic firing began at 2:33 a.m. 
and lasted for twenty-five minutes. Four or five snipers 
using automatic rifles shot a total of thirty to forty 
rounds, although some of the shots may have been 
firecrackers. Eight people were arrested including one who 
claimed he was a Black Panther, Eddie Eugene Bolden.
Bolden informed the officers he had been instructed by the 
Black Panther Party to come to Omaha to start a chapter.63
Following this resurgence of black militant violence, 
Safeway officials became more wary of their' location within 
the neighborhood.64 Sources estimated that Safeway was 
losing $10,000 a month. A.V. Sorensen met with Paul 
Hendrix, general manager for Safeway Stores, Inc., and 
Elmer Harder, Safeway Public Relations director, regarding 
their concerns, and Safeway decided to put up a fence 
around the parking lot.65 The requested permit showed that 
the fence would extend from the front of the store, 277 
feet to the property line on Twenty-Fourth Street, and that 
a gate would be placed at the entrances and exits. An 
eleven-foot high chain link fence topped with one foot of
63“Mayor Says Shoot Sniper, Stop Murder,” Omaha World-Herald, July 8, 1968.
^Ibid.
65“Store at Twenty-Fourth and Lake May Close,” Omaha World-Herald, July 8, 1968.
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* 66barbed wire would enclose the Safeway store parking lot.
Many expressed discontent over the Safeway fence; some
calling it a "detention camp."67 Even A.V. Sorensen was
6 8"very unhappy" about the construction of the fence.
Sorensen may have protested the fence, but both he and 
state officials were preparing for the worst. The Omaha 
police had honed their tactics through conferences such as 
the one that Chief Anderson and twenty-five other police 
chiefs attended on riot prevention and control in 
Warrenton, Virginia. The conference was sponsored by the 
Justice Department and the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police.69 A.V. Sorensen and other Omaha officials 
met with Governor Norbert Tiemann and state representatives 
to discuss preparation for any civil disturbances. Tiemann 
and Sorensen decided that in the event of a riot, the 
police department would be in charge until the situation 
was declared a "dire emergency." If that occurred, a newly 
created state law LB 74 would come into effect, giving the
66“Safeway’s Fence is Up; Gates Will Close Lot,” Omaha World-Herald, July 24, 1968. In 1967 
the city leased the lot from Safeway for $10 a year, allowing the police department to have jurisdiction over 
the lot to prevent the infringement on property rights. “2 Borrowed Copters Returned to Guard,” Omaha 
World-Herald, July 9, 1968.
67“Store In Omaha,” Omaha World-Herald, August 9, 1968.
68“Mayor Says Store Fence Only Answer,” Omaha World-Herald , July 22, 1968. When Safeway 
originally tried to encircle the store with a fence in 1966, Reverend General Woods stated that “Negroes 
hate chains, whether they are around a black man’s legs, on a Georgia chain gang or around a white man’s 
supermarket in Omaha.” “We Demand Rights Now,” Dundee-West Omaha Sun, March 3, 1966.
69‘T w o Will Attend Riot Conference,” Omaha World-Herald, January 27, 1968.
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governor responsibility to put local authorities under 
state control.70
Major General Lyle A. Welch, the state adjunct 
general, Major John H. Ayers, head of the State Patrol, and 
Police Inspector Monroe Coleman all visited similarly sized 
cities to look at their riot controls. From their 
experience in Columbus, Trenton, Baltimore, and Milwaukee, 
a new ordinance was passed which would limit the number of 
people allowed to gather on public streets.71 The provision 
also allowed the Mayor to suspend airport operations in the 
event of a riot and stop traffic in and out of the city. He 
could also halt the movement of trains and boats into, 
within, or from the city and prohibit the sale of alcohol. 
The mayor was also given the ability to restrict or 
completely prohibit the sale of gas and flammable liquids 
and prohibit the carrying of weapons ranging from sling 
shots to firearms. The measure was enacted as Mayor 
Sorensen stated to "preserve the health, safety, and 
property of the citizens of this community."72
The Nebraska National Guard also prepared for the 
inevitable. In an effort to test their riot control
70“City Reviews Riot Control,” Omaha World-Herald, January 4, 1968.
7'“3 To Study Riot Controls,” Omaha World-Herald, February 16, 1968.
72David Tisehendorf, “Mayor Asks Riot Power,” Omaha World-Herald, April 19, 1968.
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reflexes, 264 guardsmen were put through a sixteen-hour 
exercise. Major changes had been implemented since 1966, 
and the group was now using techniques learned at the Army 
Military Police Headquarters at Camp Gordon in Georgia.
The changes implemented increased the number of guardsmen 
available and provided tighter control over fire power. The 
new rules also allowed guardsmen to carry live ammunition 
and added 175 snipers to take care of enemy snipers.
Colonel George Talmadge sought to anticipate criticism of 
the new level of force implied in these changes by noting 
"Our job isn't to hurt people. Our job is to dissuade 
them, to restore order."73
Like the men and women in power, black youth predicted 
a long hot summer. JoAnn Donaldson then a junior at Central 
High School screamed at Governor Wallace in March:"You're 
going to get it, baby. Just you wait. You're going to get 
it this summer. Heat, baby, heat... Nebraska's going to be 
a ball of fire this summer. It's going to be the hottest 
state there is."74 Although Omaha did not turn into a raging 
inferno that summer, it was just a matter of time.
73A1 Darr, “State Guard Test Reaction to Riots,” Omaha World-Herald, April 2, 1968.
74 Howard Sibles, “Sobbing Negro Girl Screams Why? Why?,” Omaha World-Herald, March 5,
1968.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RIOT OF 1969
On February 4, 1969, the police department under
executive authority signed a contract with the University
of Nebraska at Omaha for the services of Dr. John K .
Brillhart for "sensitivity training programs" at the cost
of $3,746.25.1 During the course of these lessons, fifteen
officers at a time would spend five two-hour session with
Dr. Brillhart and then an additional forty hours of in-
service training.2 Though progressive and innovative, these
sensitivity training programs could not stop the tide of
diminishing positive police interactions with the Near
North community.
On a Tuesday night, February 25, 1969, police cruiser
# 104 sped down the road in front of Horace Mann Junior
High, at 11:05 p.m. Outside, junior high students were
being dropped off by a chartered bus coming from a skating
*
party.. The officer, John Loder, leapt from his car, 
pointed a pistol at the charter and threatened the children
11969-1970 City Council Budget Ledger. Municipal Records, City of Omaha. Located at the 
Douglas County Courthouse, 1819 Famam Street.
2Mick Road, “Adviser to Urge Deeper Training,” Dundee West-Omaha Sun, July 2, 1969.
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without reason.3 Although Dan Goodwin brought this incident 
to the attention of the police department, no disciplinary 
action was taken.
Before becoming an Omaha Police officer, Loder served 
in the Air Force for eight and a half years at the rank of
Airmen Second Class. He was honorably discharged in 1966
\
and then moved to Omaha and joined the force. Loder 
graduated from high school in Lomita, California in 1957 
and attended a junior college in Harbor City, California 
for one semester.4 A thirty-year-old father of three 
children, who lived at.3203 South 122nd Street, Loder 
attended Brillhart's sensitivity training.5 Unfortunately, 
the incident which occurred that late night in February 
would not be the last in which Loder was involved. The next 
incident would throw Omaha into chaos.
On Tuesday night, June 24, Loder and his black 
partner, James W. Smith, responded to a break-in at 10:25 
p.m. at 1701 North Twenty-First Street. There they caught 
a youth coming out of the apartment and arrested him. A 
small group of youngsters gathered around and then
^typewritten report presented to the Police Community-Relations Office in North Omaha by 
Daniel M. Goodwin, February 28, 1969. Author obtained a copy from Mr. Goodwin in November 2005.
4“Loder Once in Air Force,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
5 Ibid.; “Policeman Will Face Manslaughter Charge,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969; 
“Adviser to Urge Deeper Training,” Dundee-West Omaha Sun, July 2, 1969.
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scattered when they saw the officers.6 As the children ran 
from the officers, Loder raised his service revolver and 
fired one shot, hitting fourteen-year-old Vivian Strong at 
the base of her skull.7 A rescue squad was called, and 
Vivian Strong, dressed in green shorts and a white blouse, 
was pronounced dead on arrival at County Hospital.8
An eyewitness, Lenford Vaughan, who was standing 
behind Loder when the officer shot, described the incident: 
"He raised his arm, aimed and shot. He just fired one shot 
and Vivian fell. The cop didn't yell 'halt' or nothing.
He just stood there.and shot."9 Carl, Vaughan's younger 
brother, stated that "I hollered, 'Don't shoot, Don't 
shoot! Don't shoot!', but he did." There is some 
discrepancy as to what happened. One witness, Carrie Lee 
Liggins, a Central High School freshman, said that Vivian 
was in the house where the break-in took place and that 
Carol, Vivian's little sister, was serving as a lookout,
6“Policeman Will Face Manslaughter Charge,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
7 Strong suffered from rheumatic fever in 1964 which left her with a leaky aortic valve. She was 
one of eight children and had attended Conestoga but recently transferred to Tech Junior High. Linda 
Bradley, age nineteen, who was babysitting Strong at the time, stated that the group was having a record
party and “then we started to run. We were just running to see what the cops would do. Then that ------
shot her, right in the head. He didn’t holler or shoot in the air or anything. There was only one shot.” 
“Victim was Always on the Go,” Omaha World-Herald, June 27, 1969; “Negro Girl Killed by a Police 
Bullet at Housing Project,” Omaha World-Herald, July 25, 1969.
8“Policeman Will Face Manslaughter Charge,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969; “Policeman 
Enters A Plea of Innocent in Shooting of Girl,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
9 Contradictory Line Marks Loder Case,” Omaha World-Herald, November 11, 1969.
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but even Liggins never heard the officer shout "stop." 
Loder, however, maintained in a written statement after the 
shooting that he said "Stop or I'll shoot!" three times 
before he fired.10 Loder thought the person he shot was a 
man who appeared to have escaped from the scene of the 
crime. He stopped, leveled his weapon, and shot from a 
distance of seventy-five yards. Loder remarked that "If I 
had known it was a female I would never have shot."11 Carol 
Strong stated that after the shooting Loder pushed Vivian's 
head with his foot. Angrily she screamed at the officer, 
"Don't do that, that is my sister!" and Loder allegedly 
replied "I don't give a damn whose sister it is."12 Rosemary 
McNeil claimed Loder kicked Vivian Strong in the head; 
Sandra Lockett, said that he had merely rolled Strong's 
head with his foot.13 Both Carol and Officer Smith queried 
Loder, "Why did you shoot her?" He replied to neither.14
,0Ibid. Vivian Strong marked the sixth person in three years to be killed by an Omaha police 
officer. Loder was the first to be indicted. Prior victims included three black males under twenty, Eugene 
Nesbitt, Howard L. Stevenson, and Percy P. Hare and two mid-twenties white victims, Gerald W.
Mallinger and Robert Gustafson. The police officers who shot these young men were technically within 
their rights. Omaha law enforcement could shoot under three circumstances: 1. Purposes of self-defense by 
the officer. 2. Protecting the life of another. 3. Stopping a fleeing felony suspect after he has refused to heed 
a warning to stop. The final situation could also be deemed permissible when dealing with a perpetrator 
accused of a misdemeanor. “Six Killed by Police in Three Years,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
“ “Loder Claims Shouting Warning; Prosecution Nearing End of Case,” Lincoln Star Journal, 
September 11,1969.
12“Contradictory Line Marks Loder Case,” Omaha World-Herald, November 11, 1969.
,3“ Loder Claims Shouting Warning; Prosecution Nearing End of Case,” Lincoln Star Journal, 
September 11, 1969.
,4“Policeman Will Face Manslaughter Charge,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
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Immediately following the incident two hundred people 
gathered outside where the shooting had occurred.15 The 
first reports of vandalism occurred as the crowd moved from 
the Logan-Fontenelle Homes to the E-Zee Liquor Store at 
1709 North Twenty-Fourth Street around 11:45 p.m.16 Within 
the next five to six minutes, windows on four buses were 
broken by the mob. As a * precautionary measure police began 
sealing the 1200 to the 1800 blocks of North Twenty-Fourth 
Street. Outside of this.immediate area vandalism also 
occurred at Sixteenth and Wirt Streets and Twenty-Fifth and 
Spaulding Streets.17 Seven whites were injured passing 
through the Near North Side, and police officers advised 
whites to bypass the area.18 Governor Norbert Tiemann 
sensing the turmoil about to begin, implemented OPLAN 3/68 
so as to provide temporary military assistance to local 
Omaha responders.19
On the next evening, a. crowd began to gather on North 
Twenty-Fourth Street after, as one Fire Department official
15Ibid.
16“Negro Girl Killed by a Police Bullet at Housing Project,” Omaha World-Herald, June 25, 1969
17Ibid.
18“Policeman Enters A Pleas of Innocent in Shooting of Girl,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 
1969; “Violence Plagues Ghetto for 3rd Night,” Lincoln Evening Journal, June 27, 1969
19“After Action Report (AAR)-#7/69,” August 12, 1969, Nebraska Historical Society, Governor 
Norbert Tiemann: Box 104, Folder Adjutant General 1970, 93.
85
reported, the "fires of anger had been flamed."20 Earlier 
that night one- thousand people gathered on a baseball field 
adjacent to the Logan-Fontenelle homes.21 Leaflets were 
passed out asking "How many black children have to be 
murdered by cops before something is done?"22 The night that 
followed could only be described as "more of a hell than a 
ghetto."23 *
The Omaha police switched to emergency operation using 
490 officers in two shifts. They also created a mobile 
force of approximately 180 officers to patrol the area 
nightly between 12:30 a.m. and 3:30 a.m. Aerial 
reconnaissance was also conducted nightly from 8:30 p.m. 
until midnight. The Douglas County Sheriff's office 
patrolled the perimeters of the city to ensure that no 
outside agitators entered the city and also provided
20Report prepared by George Giddings, District 1 Chief “B” Shift. Photocopied and given to the 
author by Donald Nichols, historian for the Omaha Fire Department, October 2005. Hereafter referred to 
as Omaha Fire Department (OFD) Report.
21More than a dozen people carried rifles at this meeting. “Buildings Are Burned As Violence 
Erupts,” Omaha World-Herald, June 29, 1969, An “After Action Report” filed by the National Guard 
stated that 3,000 people gathered near the scene of Vivian’s death and listened to two hours o f speeches. 
“After Action Report (AAR)-#7/69,” August 12, 1969, Nebraska Historical Society, Governor Norbert 
Tiemann: Box 104, Folder Adjutant General 1970, 93.
22“Ten Blocks on No. 24th Hit Hardest,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
23OFD Report, 1.
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confinement facilities. Finally, the Nebraska National
2 4Guard was placed on a Code Yellow alert at 4p.m.
At approximately 9:50 p.m., the Assistant Chief of the 
"A" Shift alerted the Acting Chief of Division, the Off- 
Duty Assistant Chief and all "B" Shift District Chiefs.
The Acting Chief of Division established a command post, 
and the entire "B" Shift consisting of 120 men were also 
called back to duty.25
The first building fire occurred at 9:52 p.m. at 
Twenty-Fourth and Decatur Streets. According to the fire 
report, fire trucks were unable to enter the area due to a 
milling crowd and sporadic sniper fire, so they requested 
police protection.26 At this time the Fire Department's 
task force procedure was placed in operation. A task force 
consisted of two pumpers, an aerial truck, and a District 
Chief. By utilizing all extra apparatus, the fire 
department was able to place eight task forces in service 
and decided to put extra man power on each truck. This
24“After Action Report (AAR)-#7/69,” August 12, 1969, Nebraska Historical Society, Governor 
Norbert Tiemann: Box 104 Folder Adjutant General 1970, 94-95. Omaha’s first usage of aerial 
reconnaissance came in July 1968 with borrowed helicopters from the national guard. “2 Borrowed Copters 
Returned to Guard,” Omaha World-Herald, July 9r 1968.
25OFD Report, 1.
26Ibid. Much of the reported sniper fire was actually fireworks. Gary Johnson, “One Reporters 
Diary,” Dundee West-Omaha Sun, July 2, 1969. Captain Alfred Pattavina said he had received no reports of 
sniping at the either the Omaha Fire or Police Departments. “North Side Business Hit by Firebombs,” 
Omaha World-Herald June 26, 1969.
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greatly added to the efficiency and the speed of the task 
force at each fire. Additionally, these task forces worked 
as a single unit, responding to the fire together, working 
together at the scene, and leaving the area together. The 
study also found that the fire department could not operate 
without police protection.27
In the first night of intense fires and rioting, many 
types of businesses and dwellings were destroyed including 
a barber shop, liquor store, grocery store, delivery stand, 
shoe shop, laundromat, pawn shop, apartment building and a 
diesel repair garage. The fires that occurred on the 
evening of June 25 damaged or destroyed thirteen 
businesses, three apartment houses, and two private 
dwellings at an estimated cost of $750,000. During the 
course of the evening, firemen were subjected to both 
verbal and physical abuse. In one case a firefighter was 
hit in the head with a brick, and "were it not for his fire 
helmet, he would have been severely injured."28 Later that 
night at 11:15 p.m. national guard troops were mobilized at 
their home station and moved to a Code Orange.29
27OFD Report, 2.
28Ibid.
29“After Action Report (AAR)-#7/69,” August 12, 1969, Nebraska Historical Society, Governor 
Norbert Tiemann: Box 104, Folder Adjutant General 1970, 94-95.
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The difficulty and the uncertainty of the night's
situation could easily be seen in the 911 transcripts. A
female caller telephoned the fire operator to let him know
that the fire was spreading to the residential areas.
Operator: I see, ma'am. Officials advise that we 
can't get into that area.
Female: Oh, my God, my God, what are we going to do! 
Operator: That remains to be seen, ma'am, but we can 
not get in there at this time.
Female: Oh my goodness. Well, what kinds of 
precautions can we take—the people in. housing? What 
should we do?
Operator: We're advised to evacuate that area, ma'am. 
Female: Oh, my goodness. If you can't get in, how can 
we get out?30
Mayor Gene Leahy kept watch of the situation from his 
home. Police walked the streets fifteen abreast to protect 
the area. Although Coordinator Alfred Pattavina of Police- 
Community Relations confirmed that he was unaware of any 
sniper attacks, many police officers still received minor 
injuries.31 In the early morning hours- of June 26, the 
Superior 400 Station at 3462 Emmett Street was ordered shut 
down by Sergeant Paul E. Duff because he observed eight or 
nine carloads of people filling up gas in containers. The 
youths continued to jeer "You can't get us all, man, you
30Fire Alarm Headquarters Transcripts from June 25, 1969, 4. The author received photocopies 
from Donald Nichols in October 2005. Hereafter referred to as Transcripts.
31“Buildings are Burned as Violence Erupts,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
can't get us all."32 However as night became day, rioters' 
tempers began to cool once deprived of the cover of night.
Most of the fires burned throughout the night. 
Therefore, the fire department returned the following 
morning, June 26, to extinguish "deep seated hidden fires. 
As these fires were "small but hard to get at, they added 
to the work load of the men, who, at this time were 
expecting a long night," knowing that the angry feelings 
and restless violence of the previous night could reoccur. 
As of early morning on June 26 the "B" shift had worked 
thirty-three straight hours.
Leahy visited the Near North Side and saw the 
destruction that had taken place. The Reverend John 
Killoren, S.J., announced proudly to Mayor Leahy: "You
won't believe this, but we had over 200 kids in here 
[Bryant Center] playing basketball with the smoke drifting 
across the court the other night." Although some of 
Sorensen's recreational initiatives were helping, angry 
feelings remained.34 In total, between 9:00 p.m. on
32“North Side Business Hit by Firebombs,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
33OFD Report, 2-3.
34“Leahy Inspects Damaged Area Talk to People,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
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Wednesday and 1:00 a.m. on Thursday, twenty-three arrests 
were made.35
At an operational meeting that day, the fire 
department decided to begin by dividing all the members of 
a working shift into task forces and rotate the groups 
throughout the city. This enabled firefighters to have 
some rest and to maintain proper fire protection for the 
remainder of the city. Re-call men would not be called to 
fight riot fires but rather would be stationed at unrelated 
outposts since they would be on duty the next day.36 In 
addition to these changes officers were to review "Fire 
Fighting Procedures during Rioting Conditions" with their 
men. Such procedures included no lights or sirens, stay 
together, no salvage work, carry and use portable radios at 
all times, no ladder work unless a life is involved, fight 
only one fire at a time, and use heavy hand lines. 
Firefighters were told not to tie up the apparatus by 
setting the pump at a hydrant or raising an aerial ladder.
The assessment also found that a few small things were 
needed for more efficient operations including a bigger 
blackboard at the main station so as to document the exact
35“Buildings are Burned as Violence Erupts,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
36OFD Report, 3.
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location of each task force. Additionally the Red Gross 
sent one hundred extra cots due to the shortage of sleeping 
places for the re-called men. The Salvation Army supplied 
the Fire Department with coffee and sandwiches, as had been 
their policy at all major fires for years.37 The company 
also decided at this time it was of no use to call allied, 
local departments or Mutual Aid Fire Companies, because the 
Omaha Fire Department had been able to handle the 
situation.
That night the fires started at 8:58 p.m. and burned 
until morning. Seven businesses and two residences were 
either damaged or destroyed. These fires raised the total 
estimated loss to $925,000. Rioters also fire-bombed a 
building at Thirtieth and Erskine Streets indicating that 
rioters had left the 'immediate area of the Near North Side 
and were moving west. Gus' Dry Goods was also the victim 
of .firebombing. Investigators found no evidence to support 
contentions that these two firebombings had been a combined 
or coordinated effort.39
Attempting to fight the fires proved difficult. Fire 
rigs were waiting at Twenty-Fourth and Michigan Streets for
37OFD Report, 3.
38Ibid., 4.
39“North Side Violence Continues a 3rd Night,” Omaha World-Herald, June 27, 1969.
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crowds to disperse so that they could move further in.40 The 
500 to 600 people refused to move and the large fire 
engines could not maneuver around them. In addition to 
this difficultly, many firemen, once they were able to 
penetrate into the Near North Side, were forced to fight 
the blazes while being threatened, both verbally and 
physically.41 The violence that occurred that night was not 
just confined to property. A carload of whites shot at and 
wounded a black man, and a group of blacks beat-up a white 
man with a baseball bat.42
The next day the "A " Shift sought out hidden fires. A
summary statement from the fire department echoed what many 
in the community felt: "As the day and night of the 27th 
passed without incident our Fire Department, as a man, 
heaved a sigh of relief, possibly this would come to an 
end." For the most part it did. On June 28 only scattered 
arson fires were reported.43
Although the major violence of the riot was brief, the 
frustrations and fear that pervaded both the white and 
black Near North Sides communities was evident in the 911
40Transcripts, 13.
41“Firemen Bitter: 'Near North Considers Us White Trash,” Omaha World-Herald, June 27, 1969.
42“12 perSons, White and Black, Hurt in Night of Disorders,” Omaha World-Herald, June 27,
1969.
43OFD Report, 4.
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transcripts. Most people who were stranded in the Near
North seemed to accept the operator's answer that rescue
vehicles could simply not get in.44 Some handled the crisis
almost stoically.
Female; Yes, I was wondering if you could get some 
fire trucks out here to put out this fire at Twenty- 
Fourth and Seward. Cause we are not all alike out 
here, and this fire is liable to burn up some people's 
homes and they can't. .
Operator: Well, ma'am, they will not let the Fire 
Department in. The people will not let them in. They 
have rifles and everything and the Fire Department can 
not get i n .
Female: Oh. That's too bad. I hope they can clean it 
up because we are not all alike.45
Others voiced a powerful resentment of the rioters and 
the police.
Female:. . .we've lived down here. They don't 
own nothing, never did own nothing.
Operator: Well,. . .
Female: What's the matter with the police, they don't 
bring them here.
Operator: They won't even let the police in there.
They start throwing bricks and everything. And they 
are shooting, ma'am. And we can't. . .
Female: Oh, my God, my God, my God, what are we going 
to do?
^Transcripts, 5.
45Ibid., 15.
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Operator: I don't know, ma'am, but. . .
Female: Why do people who are not of this mess have to 
tolerate it?46
After being through this harassment and fear twice 
before, white businesses owners were exasperated.
When a store owner requested that the Fire Department send 
rigs down to put out the fire in his store, the dispatcher 
replied that they could not go in.
Male: So all a man can do is sit there and have his 
place burn.down, is that it?
Operator: I guess. . .
Male: That's the protection I get from the City of 
Omaha.
Operator: No, that's. . .
Male: I mean, where in hell is the Police Department
to take these guns away from these people, and mow 
them down and drive the trucks right through, huh? You 
have your business burn to the ground and the people 
you pay to protect they don't protect you. So what's 
the hell the use of paying taxes, huh?
Operator: Well, I pay them, too. And I don't know 
what to say .47
Some called in just to offer help, usually to aid the 
rescue teams. A male volunteered that he and other
46Transcripts, 13.
47Ibid., 17.
95
residents "want[ed] to get some water and try to keep it 
from setting this side of the block on fire."48 Another man 
at 1620 North Twenty-Fourth Street, reported that "just the 
whole building blowed [sic] up over here now. The whole 
building just blowed up." When the dispatcher asked for 
confirmation, he said: "Yeh. Man, I can see a blaze like 
mad. This is it. Another explosion. Everything going to 
burn up round here, if somebody don't help at all. If 
there is any way that we could be some help, to keep the 
guys away, I'm willing to do it. I got protection." The 
dispatcher responded "That's right. We appreciate that, 
but it's the others that are causing the trouble— they are 
throwing brickbats and shooting at Police now." 49 The 
operator reporting that "they" were shooting.at the police 
was an example of the type of rumor dissemination common to 
urban riots. Transcript records clearly show there was no 
earlier indication police being fired upon.
Nonetheless, the rumors persisted. One female called 
to. tell the dispatch operator that "they" had machine guns 
posted on the buildings.50 Police officials sought to 
dispel the rumors, but on the very next call, even though
48Ibid., 7.
49Ibid., 6.
50Ibid„ 8.
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the Police Chief had just told the operator that the 
reports of machine guns were false, the dispatcher repeated 
the rumor. He advised the caller that help was not coming 
because "they had machine guns and rocks and bricks."51
Often the subject of the rumors went unidentified, but 
the "they" in many of the dispatcher transcripts could have 
been the Black Panthers.52 Despite the small number of 
Omaha Panthers, the militant rhetoric of the organization's 
national leaders and widespread fear, certainly contributed 
to the runaway rumors in 1969. In truth, the Panthers were 
armed, but there is no evidence to show that they were 
interfering with fire-fighting missions or actively 
pursuing officers.53 David Rice, then a Panther and an 
employee of the Greater Omaha Community Action (GOCA) 
program, kept the office open until 4:00 a.m. in case 
people were injured and needed medical assistance. He also 
listened to the police radio in order to warn people of the 
officers' movements. In one instance some rioters were 
planning to "tak[e] off" the Bali Hi bar, but Rice heard 
over the police radio that an officer with a Thompson
51Ibid., 20.
52On the rise and fall of the Omaha Chapter of the Black Panther Party, see Appendix I.
53 David Rice, interview by Alonzo N. Smith, September 23, 1982. Nebraska Black Oral History 
Project, Nebraska Historical Society, Lincoln, NE. Hereafter referred to as David Rice interview.
97
submachine gun was based there, so he placed a blackboard 
on the sidewalk which said, "Stay away from Bali-Hi." Rice 
felt that the actions he took were necessary because, "You 
know I didn't want to see anybody get killed."54 Panthers 
also stood outside of the Mothers for Adequate Welfare 
office located at 2307 North Twenty-Fourth Street, further 
indicating that the Panthers were not actively involved in 
the rioting and sought to protect community stalwarts from 
the rioters.55
By the end of the week, twenty business or homes had 
been damaged or destroyed. Twenty others had been looted 
or vandalized. In recalling the Vivian Strong riots, Frank 
Peak stated: "I remember (inaud.) one lady in particular, 
an older lady. She was just smilin'. She'd got some new 
clothes out of there, and it was a real neat thing to see 
her so happy."56 However this woman was not the norm. The 
average rioter was twenty-one, worked as a laborer and was 
currently employed. Most often they were high school 
dropouts and had been booked on suspicion of a crime but 
had no recent felony convictions. Statistically, of the
54David Rice interview.
55“Panthers Defend Black Business,” Omaha World-Herald, June 26, 1969.
56Frank Peak, interview by Alonzo Smith, April 27, 1982, Black Oral History Project, Nebraska 
Historical Society, Lincoln, NE. Hereafter referred to as Frank Peak interview.
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eighty-eight people arrested from June 24 through June 29, 
72% had dropped out of high school. Nine of the rioters 
were current high school students. Two were in full-time 
job training programs through the Manpower Training and 
Development Center(OSD). Twenty-six of the thirty-eight 
dropouts had gone to Technical Junior or Senior High 
School, and most had faced disciplinary actions while 
there. Of the seventy-six non-students only 20% were 
unemployed. Only four out of the twelve students had 
summer jobs. In all, one-third of the eighty-eight 
arrested were teenagers, and outside of one twelve-year-old 
and one sixty-one year-old, all of those arrested were 
between sixteen and forty five. Oddly, only 43% of those 
arrested were native Omahans.57 Evident in these statistics 
is the fact that the early programs that A.V. Sorensen 
implemented at the request of the 1966 rioters either never 
reached these young men or were ineffective.
Black residents who did not take to the streets .were 
still outraged over the death of Vivian Strong. Thirty 
black citizens, including Ernie Chambers, demanded that the 
city immediately condemn this "senseless and unnecessary
57Arnold Garson and James Bresette, “Disturbances Arrest Profile: Laborers and Dropout, Age 
21,” from the 1969 riots clipping file at the Douglas County Historical Society.
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murder," that murder charges be filed against Loder, and 
that $100,000 in compensation be paid to Vivian Strong's 
family.58 A Vivian Strong Memorial Fund was also started, 
and as the announcement in the Omaha Star proclaimed: "Our 
money will not restore Vivian to life, nor will it bring 
the murderer to justice but it will show our great concern 
and help the family."59 People wishing to make donations 
could do so at Greater Omaha Community Action, the Spencer 
Street Barber Shop, Omaha Opportunities Industrialization 
Center(OIC), Urban League, the Leap Program, and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Center.
Some older members of the black community including, . 
Sam Cornelius, Emmett J. Dennis (of OIC), Jack West, Hallie 
Smith, and Kenneth Shearer, Carney Rountree, and Michael 
Adams (the last three from GOCA) and assorted clergymen 
walked along Twenty-Fourth Street trying to ease tensions.60 
Often they told people walking around: "The police have 
guns and they can kill you. How about going home?"61 While 
some of the young bloods thought that those who were 
telling people to "cool it" were "Toms," but even Vivian's
5?‘TJlack Outrages Citizens List Ten Demands Following Death o f 14 Year Old Girl,” Omaha 
Star, June 26, 1969.
59 Vivian Strong Memorial Fund Started,” Omaha Star, July 3, 1969.
60“Several Negroes Try to East the Tensions,” Omaha World-Herald, June 27, 1969.
61Stuart From, ‘They Worked to Cool,” Dundee-West Omaha Sun, July 2, 1969.
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father, James Strong, stated that "trying to get revenge 
isn't going to do any good."62
The riots surely did not do anyone any good either in 
the Near North Side or in Omaha. City Finance Director 
Edwin J. Hewit stated that $40,000 would be needed to pay 
the overtime for Omaha Police officers from June 16 until 
June 30.63 The city * council, after processing the list of 
condemned buildings, did not think that the rubble would be 
all cleaned up before September. As late as August 9, the 
Fire Department estimated that eight of the twelve severely 
damaged buildings had not been cleaned up. The eight 
owners refused to clean the mess. One of them said he was 
leaving the rubble as "a monument to what the rioters did 
to him."64 Police Patrolmen David Heese observed that the 
Near North Side "look[ed] like a bombed out area."65
In the week that followed the initial disturbance, 
Postmaster John Munnelly resumed mail delivery to all parts 
of the Near North Side except for the area along Twenty-
62Gary Johnson, “One Reporter’s Diary,” Dundee-West Omaha Sun, July 2, 1969; “Girl’s Father 
Wants End to Violence,” Omaha World-Herald, June 28, 1969.
63“Pay for Riot Cost $40,000,” Omaha World-Herald, July 3, 1969.
^ “City May Clean Up the Rubble,” Omaha World-Herald, August 9, 1969. The businesses that 
did not bother to clean after the riots were the Northside Laundromat, Rubeck Grocery, E-Zee Drive Thru, 
Ben Blatt Grocery, Crosstown Delivery, Crosstown Loan, Monico Diesel Truck Repair, and Thrifty 
Package Liquor. Ibid. The majority o f businesses set on fire were white owned. “17 o f 20 Torch Targets 
White-Owned Business,” Omaha World-Herald, June 29, 1969.
65But Blazes, Unrest Seem Less Intense,” Omaha World-Herald, June 29, 1969.
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Fourth Street from Cuming to Locust street. Those who 
needed to pick-up their mail were able to do so at the 
downtown office at Seventeenth and Capitol Streets. The 
post office was vandalized on Wednesday and would remain 
closed until repairs could be made.
As summer came to a close, the heat and anger of June 
began to fade, but Loder's story was far from over. When 
motions to dismiss the charges against Loder were rejected 
by Judge Simon A. Simon, those seeking justice saw some 
hope of retribution.67 Loder's defense team, Joseph J.
Vance and Paul Watts, began working on the case while 
Donald Knowles and Lawrence Corrigan prepared to prosecute. 
A bomb threat was called into the courthouse on the first 
day.68 After that, the trial preceded with minimal 
disturbances. Two witnesses, Sarah Davis and Charlene 
Johnson, were dismissed because of excessive sobbing.69 
After a six day trial, Officer John Loder was found 
innocent of manslaughter.70 Loder's jury, which deliberated
66“Partial Mail Delivery Resumed,” Omaha World-Herald June 27, 1969.
67“Motions to Drop Count Against Loder Rejected,” Lincoln Star Journal, November 12, 1969.
68Robert Hoig, “Loder Juror Released, Another Man Selected,” Omaha World-Herald Vertical 
File at the W. Dale Clark Library Riots, Omaha 1969.
69“Contradictory Line Marks Loder Case,” Omaha World-Herald, November 11, 1969.
70Robert Hoig, “Acquitted Loder Plans to Ask for his Old Job Back on Force,” Omaha World- 
Herald, March 18, 197Q. Many feared that an acquittal would bring about a resurgence of violence. 
Although no formal disturbances took place, four downtown retailers, J.C. Penney, Woolworth’s, Brandeis, 
and Malashocks, were vandalized by between 100-200 black youths. Additionally a bomb threat was
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for twelve hours, was all white with six men and six 
women.71 Upon his acquittal, Loder extended his sympathies 
to the family. Vivian's mother, not at all surprised with 
the verdict, replied: "His sympathy won't bring Vivian
back."72 State Senator John DeCamp of Neligh noted: "Black 
people are extremely bitter." He also remarked that hints 
that the police department might put Loder on the Near 
North Side again was "frightening to me."73 Loder was 
reassigned to West Omaha.74 Most people both white and 
black did not want Loder to have cruiser duty in their 
neighborhoods.75 Loder was fired again in November for 
multiple infractions.76
called into First National Bank. “Youth Crowd Disrupts Four Downtown Stores,” Omaha World-Herald, 
March 19, 1970.
7I“Loder’s Jurors ‘Slept on Verdict’,” Omaha World-Herald, March 18, 1970; Robert Hoig, 
“Acquitted Loder Plans to Ask for his Old Job Back on Force,” Omaha World-Herald, March 18, 1970.
72“Mrs. Strong: Loder Verdict No Surprise,” Omaha World-Herald, March 18, 1970.
73“DeCamp: Don’t Put Loder in North Side,” Omaha World-Herald, January 22, 1971.
74“Chambers ‘Warns’,” Omaha World-Herald, January 26, 1971.
75“Leahy: Loder Cruiser Area Decision Soon,” Omaha World-Herald, January 21, 1971.
76“Chief Fires James Loder Second Time,” Omaha World-Herald, November 30, 1971.
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CONCLUSION
A riot is at bottom the language of the unheard. It 
is the desperate, suicidal cry of one who is so fed up with 
powerlessncss of his cave existence that he asserts that■ he 
would rather be dead than ignored.
—Martin Luther King, Jr.1
Until recently, the Black Freedom Movement has been 
written about in-neat, convenient categories. Non-violent 
direct action, in the manner of King, ended with the Watts 
uprising; the term self-defense originated with the Black 
Panther Party in 1966, and rioting was only a Northern 
urban phenomenon. Books such as Freedom North, This is 
America?, and Dissent in Wichita have succeeded in 
challenging the way civil rights history has been told.2 
What emerges from these new studies and from the Omaha 
experience is that blacks in urban areas, regardless of how 
large or small their numbers, fought against oppression in 
a manner which they saw fit. Omaha was not a case of 
mimicry; rather the disturbances which occurred in 1966,
Robert H. Brisbane, Black Activism: Racial Revolution in the United States, 1954-1970 (Valley 
Forge: Judson Press, 1974), 159.
2Woodard and Theoharris’ book is a collection o f  the direct action civil rights outside o f  the 
American south. Rusty Monhollon’s book focuses on many radical movements through Lawrence, Kansas 
during the 1960’s including women’s liberation and Black Power. Finally, Gretchen Eick’s monograph 
documents the triumphs and struggles o f  the civil rights movement in Wichita. The final two books are 
part o f  the growing literature o f the Midwestern black freedom movement. Jeanne Theoharris and Komozi 
Woodard, eds., Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2003); Rusty L. Monhollon, “This is America? ”: The Sixties in Lawrence, Kansas (New York: 
Palgrave, 2004); Gretchen Cassel Eick, Dissent in Wichita: The Civil Rights Movement in the Midwest, 
1954-72 (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 2001)
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1968, and 1969, were authentic expressions of the 
desperation that blacks felt.
The reasons for urban rioting in the late 1960s are 
complex and often intertwined. Clearly many blacks felt 
disenchantment following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.3 These laws transformed the 
South but had limited impact in the North. The problems of 
the northern ghettos could not be so easily addressed. On 
January 8, 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson announced
that Congress would provide $7 90 million in anti-poverty 
aid. But as Johnson later conceded following the riots,
"As I see it, we've moved the Negro from D+ to C - . He's 
still nowhere. He knows it. And that's why he's out on the 
streets."4
One maxim seemed to hold true within the ghetto which 
was often not known to the outside world. Northern blacks 
had already achieved some of the social acceptance that 
Southern black leaders were striving for and it had 
accomplished nothing. This forced many Northern blacks to 
turn their backs on integration. As Robert Vernon penned
3Kenneth B. Clark, “The Wonder is There Have Been So Few Riots,” in Black Protest in the 
Sixties, ed August Meier, Elliot Rudwick, and John Bracey, Jr., 106-115 (New York: Markus Wiener 
Publishing, 1991).
4 Eick, Dissent in Wichita, 96.
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in his book, Black Ghetto: "Integration is already here and 
it's still hell./'5 He continued: "Wabts, Harlem, 
Philadelphia, Rochester show that throwing a few scraps and 
bone of civil rites [sic] to the Negro middle class does 
not solve the problems of class oppression."6 The "few 
scraps" meant little to these young, Northern-born African- 
Americans. Their parents often understood through personal 
experience the horror of living in the South. But these 
youngsters had no such basis of comparison. Their 
expectations were higher.
If the 1966 riot in Omaha represents violence as 
protest, city officials did take action to that protest. 
Mayor Sorensen's administration met with the young men of 
the Near North Side and responded with a set of programs 
designed to address their frustrations, such as job 
training, recreational facilities, and a Police Athletic 
League.7 These programs were sincerely implemented and
5Robert Vemon, Black Ghetto (New York: Merit Publishing, 1968) 10.
6 Vernon, Black Ghetto, 29-30.
7In Lawrence Kansas the mere threat o f  a riot prompted the local government to make significant 
changes. Previously Lawrence voters had turned down bond proposals to build a municipal pool in 1956, 
1961, and 1963. One evening young black students began to amass in downtown Lawrence. The situation 
was diffused and a community meeting was scheduled for the next day. The students complained o f lack o f  
recreational and job opportunities and police brutality. However, the meeting focused largely on the 
swimming pool issue, and the city commission voted unanimously to lease the Four Season pool until 
Labor D a y .  The Four Season pool became operational by August 11, a mere three days after the 
youngsters met with the Lawrence Human Relations Commission (LHRC). Later that year, on November 
28, 1967, the bond passed. Monhollon, This is America?, 85-89.
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helped to ease tensions for over a year, but they did not 
eliminate long-held frustrations. The arrival of George 
Wallace and the incident at the Civic Auditorium led to a 
new series of disturbances in March and April of 1968 that 
should have alerted city officials to the fact that all was - 
not well in the Near North Side.
In the case of Omaha like many other metropolitan 
areas the initial riots of the 1960s truly represented 
violence as a form of protest. These early protestors were 
not arbitrarily destroying; rather their "riots were an 
attempt to alert America, not overturn it, to denounce its 
practices, not renounce .its principles. . .For the great 
majority of blacks, the American dream, tarnished though it 
ha[d] been.for centuries, was still the ultimate 
aspiration."8 In Omaha as elsewhere, most rioters hit 
stores that charged exorbitant prices but left schools 
alone.9 Robert Fogelson noted why such stores were targets 
of the rioters: "Most whites and white institutions act at 
their worst in the ghetto, and thus it is at their worst 
that most black perceive them."10
8Robert M. Fogelson, Violence As Protest: A Study o f  Riots and Ghettos (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1971), 12-13.
9 Ibid., 16-17.
10Ibid., xv.
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If the riot in 1966 was built on,frustrations with 
specific goals to be achieved, by 1969 only rage remained. 
The reasons for young black Omahans .rioting had changed 
from obtaining opportunities and equality, to destroying 
every vestige of the oppressive system which controlled
them. Even the civil authorities responded differently.
In 1966 Mayor Sorensen attempted to accommodate the 
rioters. By 1969 Mayor Leahy's primary concern was damage 
control, and because of the rage element, no programs could 
satisfy the rioters. White Omahans generally were shocked 
by the riot of 1966. At that time rioting was a big city 
phenomenon that many assumed could not happen locally. By 
1969 Omahans had become desensitized after three years of 
"long hot summers," countless disturbances throughout the 
United States had diminished the shock value of the riots.
During riots blacks spontaneously took control of. 
their ghettos, and "the ordinary patterns of authority and 
property relationship were set aside."11 In essence this is 
what rioting, be it in Omaha, Newark, Watts, or anywhere
else, came to mean. A taking back of power, an assertion
1 ‘Peter H. Rossi, ed., Ghetto Revolts, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick:Transaction Books, 1973), 2.
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of self, black rioting in the 1960s became the ultimate cry 
for. autonomy.
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APPENDIX I 
THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
As in other urban locales, "people who would have 
ordinarily been, in a way, outcasts in a community" 
comprised Omaha's Black Panther Party.1 Others, like Frank 
Peak, did not join until they reached their "breaking 
point," in his case after the murder of Vivian Strong.2 
During an interview taken over twenty years after his 
initial recruitment into the Black Panther Party, Peak was 
asked what the party offered him that other organizations 
had not. He replied: a "sense of belonging, sense of being, 
sense of being a person, a human being."3 The Black Panther 
Party (BPP) gave disenfranchised young men an organized 
outlet to control their own lives.
Eddie Eugene Bolden was born in Columbus, Ohio but was 
raised in East St. Louis, Illinois. In 1966 he came to 
Omaha seeking employment. The twenty-four-year old, 
increasingly appalled at the "actions by politicians and 
police in the black community and by the whole system,"
‘David Rice, interview by Alonzo N. Smith, September 23, 1982. Nebraska Black Oral History 
Project, Nebraska Historical Society, Lincoln, NE.
2 Edward Poindexter had tried to recruit Peak for years but he refused until his “breaking point.” 
Frank Peak, interview by Alonzo N. Smith, February 27, 1982. Nebraska Black Oral History Project, 
Nebraska Historical Society, Lincoln, NE.
3 Ibid.
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decided to take action.4 By 1968 he had learned of the 
Panthers and attended several meetings in California. 
Impressed by his interest, the National Black Panther Party 
appointed Bolden to begin' a branch in Omaha. He quickly 
recruited Veronza Bowers who served as his "number-two" man 
and James Grigsby who worked as the local Minister of 
Information.5
The average Omaha Black Panther Party member was a 
male in his late teens or twenties, recruited locally 
through word of mouth and literature.6 By July 23, 1968 the
Omaha chapter consisted of twenty-five members including 
seven females.7 After August membership remained relatively 
stagnant with between twenty and twenty-five people calling 
themselves Panthers including four or five females.8 The 
initiation process was relatively simple. As soon as an 
individual signed up at the local level, he or she was 
considered an Omaha Panther. Following the initial 
expression of interest, the member was required to attend 
an indoctrination class for three months before becoming a
4“Panthers Seeking,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, May 20, 1969.
Correspondence with Giitter and FBI records confirm this but one seventeen-year-old was also 
listed a member. Black Panther Party, aka Black Panther Party for Self-Defense Omaha, Nebraska, 12 
November 1968,Omaha FBI File 157-403-163. Obtained through the Freedom o f Information Act (FOIA).
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 4.
8Ibid., 4-5.
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full-ledged Panther, approved by the Black Panther Party in 
Oakland.9
At a July 26, 1968 meeting mcmbcro decided that each
new recruit would pay a five dollar initiation fee and an 
assessment fee of thirty dollars. These collected funds in 
turn were used to pay for renting a meeting hall, 
purchasing radio equipment and other expenses as needed. 
According to FBI informers, Omaha Party members were 
encouraged to steal and burglarize in order to obtain funds 
for the organization.10 Though the Party was now able to 
secure funds for a permanent meeting space, the Panther's 
office changed frequently because failure to pay rent.
When they could secure a space, the office was adorned with 
pictures of Chairman Mao, Huey Newton, and Eldridge 
Cleaver. Regular meetings were held at 3325, North Thirty- 
Eighth Street and then later at 3120 North Twenty-Fourth 
Street between July and mid-October, 1968.11 According to 
West Omaha-Dundee Sun reporter Tom Giitter, who frequently 
wrote articles on the Black Panther Party, members were 
often anxious: "During one visit I saw mattresses against
9Ibid.
10Ibid., 5. A police department official advised the FBI on October 21, 1968 that he had been 
unable to determine that Omaha’s BPP had been involved in any illegal activities. He was aware that most 
active members had been previously involved with the law. Ibid., 14.
n“Panthers Seeking,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, May 20, 1969.
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the windows of their headquarters. They believed police 
were going to raid their headquarters."12 Meetings changed 
from twice weekly to once a week after that October.13
The Omaha Party's objectives encompassed many 
initiatives which directly effected the youth of North 
Omaha. These included creating a free breakfast program, 
encouraging teachers who related to "brothers and sisters" 
to instruct in the Near North Side and working with the 
high school organization, Blacks Achieving Nationalism 
Through Unity (BANTU). The Party also set out to 
revolutionize the Omaha Public School system by 
establishing a new education program which would eliminate 
the problem of "blacks learning one thing in school, and 
going home to a different world" and would combat black 
parental apathy toward education.14
In the Black Panther Party average rank and file 
members often went to speaking engagements, community 
activities, rallies, and wrote articles for the 
newsletter.15 Certain community activities like the free 
breakfast program served a dual purpose. In addition to
12Tom Giitter, e-mail message to author, December 16, 2005.
13Black Panther Party, aka Black Panther Party for Self-Defense Omaha, Nebraska, 12 November 
1968, Omaha FBI File 157-403-163. Obtained through the Freedom o f  Information Act (FOLA.)
14“Panthers Seeking,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, May 20, 1969.
15Frank Peak interview.
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providing students with a meal, in this ministry the
■Panthers strove to teach self-determination. Unfortunately,
the free breakfast program also frequently changed
locations because many schools did not want to house the
project. At the time, public schools were only serving
peanut butter sandwiches to students and did not provide a
full hot breakfast. Thus, the Omaha Public School system
may have felt some competition from the Black Panther
Party. Later the school system created a hot breakfast
program, and many Panthers felt that the change was made
because the Omaha Public School system did not want the
Black Panther Party to have an influence on the kids.16
The Panthers also engaged the community by
distributing informational pamphlets. The following is an
excerpt from a pamphlet handed-out by unknown individuals
on June 28, 1968 and June 30, 1968, in the Near North
Side.17 In it, the author outlines the goal of the party
and dispels misconceptions:
"We know what we want and need and must have: the 
power to determine the sanctity of our own black 
communities. And we know what we must do to possess
that power: organize ourselves into an organization
that we ourselves control, that is not controlled
16Ibid
17Black Panther Party, aka Black Panther Party for Self-Defense Omaha, Nebraska, 12 November 
1968, Omaha FBI File 157-403-163. Obtained through the Freedom o f  Information Act (FOIA).
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either by outsiders or their lackeys. It was for this 
purpose, and this purpose alone, that the Black 
Panther Party was formed. It belongs to you, black 
people, join it and employ it as a tool to liberate 
our communities, to unite liberated communities into a 
nation-wide force, and in the process of doing that we 
will have won many victories, we will be a powerful 
and upright people."18
On April 30, 1969, the Black Panthers sponsored a 
"Free Huey" rally at Kountze Park. Between sixty and 
seventy-five people gathered to listen to speeches 
advocating the reform of Omaha's schools, calling for black 
unity, and speaking of the conditions of Omaha's Near North 
Side. Speakers included, Raleigh House, Gary House, Robert 
Cecil, Gene Rose, and Bolden, all local chapter members.19
According to one FBI informant, after■the summer of 
1968 the Black Panther Party was fairly well-organized, but 
due to the poor leadership of Eddie Bolden, the 
organization began to disintegrate leaving the Omaha 
chapter inactive during the winter months. Bolden 
explained that the local chapter had expelled members, "Who 
were using our political party as a front for illegal
18Ibid.
19On October 28, 1967, Black Panther Party Co-founder, Huey P. Newton was involved in a gun 
battle with the Oakland Police Department which left Officer John Frey dead and Officer Herbert Heanes 
severely wounded. Newton was arrested on felony charges for murder, assault, and kidnapping. His 
imprisonment and subsequent trial created a windfall o f  publicity for the Black Panther Party. “Free Huey” 
rallies were held by sympathizers around the United States to show solidarity with imprisoned Black 
Panther leader. The one held in Omaha was to bring attention to Newton’s appeal. Black Panther Party 
Omaha Division, 6 June 1969, FBI File 157-403-518; Bobby Seale, Seize the Time: The Story o f  the Black 
Panther Party and Huey P. Newton (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1968), 188.
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[activities]. We are smaller but stronger."20 In March and 
April of 1969 Bolden tried to invigorate the program with 
the recruitment of younger, mostly high-school members.
The Party still remained disorganized, and according to the 
FBI source, affiliated with BANTU only for publicity 
purposes.21
Student activism in Central High School began in the 
fall of 1968. Black students made six demands of the 
administration. First was to remove from the library Eugene 
O'Neill's The Emperor Jones because of its racist themes. 
Second was to allow more black students on the student 
council.. Third was to lower the qualifications for senior 
class officers. Fourth was to have Central involved in 
more civil rights activities. Fifth was to add more Afro- 
American history to the curriculum. Finally the requestors 
wanted an assembly of all Central High Students to hear 
Ernest Chambers speak.22
Central began to accommodate some of these requests by 
incorporating African-American history when possible, 
including three special lectures on African-American
20“Student Club Is Organized by Panthers,” Omaha World-Herald, May 5, 1969.
21 Black Panther Party Omaha Division, 12 June 1969, Omaha FBI File 157-403-539. Obtained 
through the Freedom o f Information Act (FOIA).
22 Larry Parrot, “Negro Students Ask 6 Changes at Central,” Omaha World-Herald, December 14,
1968.
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history. The administration also made tentative plans to 
teach African-American history after school the next 
semester. Finally they scheduled a meeting on
discrimination at the YMCA.23 Two days after these plans had 
been made, more problems began to occur at Central High 
School. Twenty students accused the administration of 
"over-supervision" and discouraging black students from 
eating in the North or predominately white cafeteria.24
In a two hour meeting in Principal Gaylord Moeller's 
office, Ernest Chambers and the Reverend Emmett T.
Streeters talked about the issues that Central High School 
students had identified. In total, there were now thirteen 
problems that students wished addressed including that 
African-American history be part of the required history 
curriculum taught by a "qualified black teacher." This 
demand was especially important after students complained 
that a black student received a lower grade because he 
reported on a topic in African-American history. Other 
demands included the outlawing of racially degrading signs 
including cartoon caricatures. All blacks who still
23Ibid.
^ “Reconciliation Tried at Central High School,” Omaha World-Herald, December 16, 1968.
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disagreed fundamentally with the administration would be 
invited to transfer.25
Militancy increased at Central in December after two 
black students were suspended following a dispute with a 
teacher in study hall. Fights broke our frequently in the 
hall, and thus, all ninety-four teachers were required to 
stand in the hall during passing period. Despite some 
improvements, participants on both sides of the fight were 
still aggravated. One teacher who wished to remain 
anonymous observed: "Take [for example] Afro-American
history. A few weeks ago students were demanding it. Now 
we have it and they won't attend class." The teacher 
neglected to mention that the class was a non-credit course 
which met once a week a 4 p.m. Assistant Principal William 
Pierson was convinced that outsiders were responsible: "If
we did not have outside influences we would not have a race 
problem. . .1 think most of the tension here is among black
students themselves. Between militants and non-militants." 
Moeller agreed, stating that the racial unrest at Central 
was because "black student leaders were at the behest of 
black militants in the city."26
25“Central High Negroes List Thirteen Problems,” Omaha World-Herald, December 17, 1968.
26“Central’s Racial Problem May Be Easing,” Omaha World-Herald February 16, 1969.
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One such group that was "at the behest" of black 
militants was BANTU. Blacks Achieving Nationalism Through 
Unity (BANTU) started at Tech High School in April 1969.
The group met each Friday at 7:30 p.m. at the Black Panther 
Party headquarters on 3120 North Twenty-Fourth Street.
Gary House, Robert Cecil, and Robert Griffo, all Tech High 
School students, and Lew Davis from Central High School 
comprised the main cohort of officers.27 The students 
petitioned Superintendent Owen A. Knutzen to meet with 
them, and he promptly rejected the request. Instead, he 
submitted a letter to BANTU officers stating "Parents of 
students, the School-Community Advisory Committee, the 
NAACP, the Urban League, and all residents of the affected 
community should have an opportunity to reflect, analyze 
and react to these demands."28
A total of twenty-three points, "these demands" 
stressed the improvement of Omaha's school system ranging 
from the seemingly harmless "serve soul food cooked by 
black cooks and force all black students to attend" to more 
serious charges of removing "all Toms and white racist
27Black Panther Party Omaha Division, 12 June 1969, Omaha FBI File 157-403-539 Obtained 
through the Freedom o f Information Act (FOIA).; “Student Club Is Organized by Panthers,” Omaha 
World-Herald, May 5, 1969.
28“No Meeting is Scheduled with BANTU,” Omaha World-Herald May 14, 1969.
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faculty members" in order to liberate Tech from the "racist 
board of Education." The students also declared that 
Malcolm X's birthday should be a national holiday.29
Denied the opportunity of a formal meeting to verbally 
address their desires,. BANTU continued with many of their 
stated objectives. One-third of Tech students did not 
attend classes so as to honor of Malcolm X's birthday in 
May 1969. That day over 400 Tech students were absent from 
school, far greater than the average rate of ten percent. 
Both black and white students played hooky but Tech High 
School principal, Carl Palmquist, suspected that white 
students were absent because of fear of racially based 
reprisals. Assistant principal Pierson stated that at 
Central High School 240 students were absent from the 
normal attendance of 2,000. At North High School, 
Principal Harold Reeves stated that absenteeism was at ten 
percent compared to the usual five to seven percent of the 
2,200 students. Other Omaha Public schools showed less 
absenteeism. Clarence Barbee, principal of Horace Mann, 
stated that the day was normal and uneventful.30
29Black Panther Party Omaha Division, 12 June 1969, Omaha FBI File 157-403-539. Obtained 
through the Freedom o f  Information Act (FOIA).
30“Absenteeism Takes Jump for ‘X ’ day,” Omaha World-Herald, May 19, 1969.
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The absenteeism was originally construed and 
advertised as an expression of honor for Malcolm X. In the 
end the organized programs to "pay tribute to this man's 
life were poorly attended. The Omaha Opportunities 
Industrialization Center, Inc. (OIC) had an open house for 
students to discuss black culture and race relations, but 
by 10:30 a.m., no one had arrived. Omaha Black Panther 
Party leader Eddie Bolden suggested that everyone go to 
Kountze Park to attend a rally, thirteen blocks from the 
corner of Thirty-Second and Pickney Streets, where the 
house that Malcolm lived in once stood.31 However this event 
also had poor turnout in part caused by the poor weather.
In all, the official Malcolm X Truancy day held on May 19, 
1969, was a failure.32
The relationship between Omaha's Black Panther Party 
and BANTU was for mutual benefit. BANTU needed support and 
guidance and the Party needed an infusion of fresh blood. 
Unfortunately, because of COINTELPRO and leadership issues, 
the Panther chapter in Omaha was never a major force, and
31Ibid.
32Black Panther Party Omaha Division, 12 June 1969, Omaha FBI File 157-403-539. Obtained 
through the Freedom o f Information Act (FOIA).
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this could have been why BANTU's impact on the community 
was limited.33
Other Black Panther Party associations were more 
successful. The Peace and Freedom Party (PFP) formed 
locally on the University of Nebraska-Lincoln campus in the 
Fall Semester of 1968 . 34 With a total of thirty-eight 
students, the campus group, which did not share a formal 
connection with the Black Panther Party, did share similar 
policies and goals. The group's first project was to 
fundraise for Chambers to seek election on Omaha's school 
board.35 The group held an organizing convention on August 
24, 1968 in Fontenelle Park. Over 300 people attended, 
including James Grigsby, the minister of information for 
Omaha Black Panthers.36
Following the positive response, the Peace and Freedom 
Party sponsored the Midwest Conference on Movement
33 Franklin Delano Roosevelt first initiated Counter Intelligence Programs (COINTELPRO) in the 
mid-1940s to combat such internal dissidents such as the Socialists Workers’ Party and Communist Party- 
USA (CPUSA). In the 1960s the Federal Bureau o f  Investigation (FBI) greatly expanded the groups and 
individuals which they investigated to include civil rights leaders, new leftists, and other activists. 
Regarding black nationalist groups, the FBI used bad-jacketing, infiltration, and other questionable means 
to achieve the “neutralization o f  black extremist groups, the prevention o f  violence by these groups, and the 
prevention o f  coalitions between black extremists organizations.” Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, 
Agents o f  Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian 
Movement (Cambridge: South End Press, 2002), 37-40.
34 “Peace and Freedom Group Is Formed on NTJ Campus,” Lincoln Star, September 17, 1968. The 
founding convention for the Peace and Freedom Party (PFP) was held on March 16, 1968 in Richmond, 
California; House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, 59;
35“Peace and Freedom Group is Formed on NU Campus,” Lincoln Star, September 17, 1968;
Daily Nebraskan, March 20, 2005.
36“New Party Focus Aims at Alienated,” Daily Nebraskan, September 13, 1968.
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Politics, held September 27-29 in Lincoln. The weekend was 
endorsed and sponsored by a number of organizations, 
including: Allies of Black Liberation, the Black Panther 
Party of Omaha, the Nebraska Draft Resistance Union, the 
Student Committee on Political Education, and Students for 
a Democratic Society. Friday, September 27 was set aside 
so that participants could make informal contacts. The 
following day was scheduled exclusively for workshops, 
including a closed session on black unity. Other sessions 
presented topics ranging from black liberation and white 
radicalism to student power and the nature of economic 
imperialism.37 At 2:30 p.m. on Sunday, in conjunction with 
the Midwest Convention, the regional convention of the 
Peace and Freedom Party met concerning the Midwestern 
campaign of presidential candidate E l d n d g e  Cleaver.
Although an Omaha FBI informer stated that 350 
individuals were in attendance on the first night of the., 
conference, he speculated that most came to see Ernie 
Chambers speak and assumed they were "mainly students who 
were curious in what Chambers had to say and were not 
followers of Chambers." Despite the large showing to hear
37“New Left Schedules Movement Workshop,” Daily Nebraskan, September 24, 1968.
38Students for a Democratic Society/Nebraska Peace and Freedom Party, 2 October 1968, Omaha 
FBI File 100-6890F-20. Obtained through the Freedom o f  Information Act (FOIA).
123
Chambers, only thirty students attended the remainder of 
the conference. Of those thirty, twenty attended the 
additional Nebraska Peace and Freedom Party session 
supporting the presidential campaign of Eldridg.e Cleaver.39
In the fall of 1968 Eldridge Cleaver came to Omaha. 
Earlier that year Bolden shared a platform with Cleaver 
when he spoke at the National Convention of the Peace and 
Freedom party on August 24 . 40 Cleaver, in his typical 
manner, cursed and used inflammatory rhetoric. The fairly 
large audience began "grumbling as people were kind of 
turned off" and began to leave.41 Most egregious to the 
spectators was Cleaver's frequent use of the term "pussy." 
Cleaver spoke about "pussy power" and "that our women, have 
a very strong influence on our men and the influence comes 
often times in terms of sexual attraction." But Rice, 
present at the speech that day,* felt that Cleaver simply 
did not articulate his ideas well.42 Perhaps additional 
reasons for the diminishing audience was that the
39 Ibid.
40Black Panther Party Omaha Division, 12 June 1969, Omaha FBI File 157-403-539. Obtained 
through the Freedom o f Information Act (FOLA).
41David Rice interview. Another source stated that over five hundred people attended, half black 
and half white, but by the time Cleaver spoke the crowds had already begun to dwindle. “Peace Party 
Signature,” Omaha World-Herald, August 25, 1968.
42David Rice interview.
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convention, scheduled to start at 3:05 p.m., began an hour 
later due to sound problems.43
Although the Panthers gathered enough signatures, 
there was not enough interest to place Cleaver on the 
Nebraska ballot that November. Nonetheless, many in the 
community felt that "the Black Panther presence in Omaha 
represents a positive new response to a negative old way."44 
According to Eddie Bolden in a 1968 news release, "If the 
Black Panthers are bad news, they are only bad news for a 
racist society. . .They are the answer to the present 
society which has promulgated all of the ills which the 
Black [Panther Party] is attempting to correct."45 One of 
the first wrongs the group attempted to correct began with 
police-community relations.
As was demonstrated in prior chapters, the Omaha 
police and the Near North community had an antagonistic 
relationship at best. Bolden felt that many Omaha police, 
"value[d] property life above human life."46* The Omaha Black 
Panther Chapter established a "pig patrol" and sought to
43“Peace Party Signature,” Omaha World-Herald, August 25, 1968.
^ “Panthers Say,” Omaha Star, July 11, 1968.
45Ibid.
46“Panthers Seeking,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, May 20, 1969.
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decentralize the Omaha Police Department.47 Bolden also 
stated that "there was no [violent] activity until the 
police force began to demonstrate their military prowess 
intending to intimidate Black residents."48 According to 
Bolden, "Now that the Black Panthers are in Omaha, the 
white police force will no longer be able to ride rough­
shod over the Blacks in this community without paying a 
heavy price."49 Bolden further encouraged Omaha African- 
Americans to, "Save your guns, black brothers, because this 
nation is moving towards a police state."50
FBI informants reported that there was general talk in 
August 1968 of creating a racial incident in Omaha and of 
purchasing fifteen Remington twelve gauge shotguns. But "no 
definite plans were made on either matter."'51 The Black 
Panthers, although frequently using a violent rhetoric, 
opposed spontaneous riots and window breaking. As Bolden 
remarked, "It's not revolutionary and not strategic because 
police will corral people and a lot of us will wind up 
getting killed, and shot, and in jail. This is a useless
47Tom Giitter, “Inside the “Liberation School’,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun December 18, 1969.
48“Panthers Say,” Omaha Star, July 11, 1968.
49Ibid.
50“Panthers Seeking,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, May 20, 1969.
51 Black Panther Party Omaha Division, 12 June 1969, Omaha FBI File 157-403-539. Obtained 
through the Freedom o f  Information Act (FOIA.)
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waste; the money can be put to other uses."52 Eddie Bolden
made similar comments in a speech at Midwestern College in
Denison, Iowa on February 26, 1969. A student recorded the
speech and gave it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). In the taped recording Bolden offered the normal
Panther rhetoric and reiterated the Black Panther Party's
commitment to the ten-point party platform. Again he
expressed his opinion on rioting:
"And we say black people, black people in this 
country, don't sit around.and say nothing is going to 
happen because it's happening. And, we say don't sit 
down and let our spontaneous riots happen in the 
streets. For we get shot up, corralled, unorganized. 
We got to organize. We must organize and we must 
respect the kind of fashion that it is the man being 
the gun who's dangerous."53
Following the shooting of Vivian Strong, one informant 
reported that at the meeting on Logan-Fontenelle Field on 
June 25 at Twenty-Second and Charles Streets, Bolden did 
not advocate violence as a result of the incident. Rather 
he asked those present how they would react if a black 
police officer had been accused.54 Additionally, a source 
advised the FBI that the informer did not feel that members
52“Panthers Seeking,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, May 20, 1969.
53Black Panther Party, aka Black Panther Party for Self-Defense Omaha Nebraska, 12 November 
1968, Omaha FBI File 157-403-163. Obtained through the Freedom o f  Information Act (FOIA).
54 Ibid., 44.
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of the Black Panther Party in Omaha were responsible for 
any of the fire bombing following the death of Vivian- 
Strong. Members of the group, however, were spotted 
patrolling the area with weapons.55
One of the more positive outcomes to materialize 
following the riot of 1969 was the Vivian Strong Liberation 
School. The June 25,1969 issue of the Black Panther 
outlined the ideal schedule at any liberation school.
Monday was revolutionary history day, Tuesday revolutionary 
culture day, Wednesday current events, Thursday a movie, 
and on Friday the group should take a field trip.56 The 
Omaha liberation school actively taught anti-capitalism.57 
Located at 2616 Parker Street, classes were held from 5:30 
p.m. until 8 p.m., Monday through Friday. These sessions 
included discussions and a hot meal for all students.58
At the school David Rice taught that "the use of the gun 
is bad and evil, but when you're dealing with survival it's 
necessary."59 He also stated that "The symbol of a black
55 Black Panther Party Omaha Division, 18 September 1969, Omaha FBI File 157-403-779. 
Obtained through the Freedom o f Information Act (FOIA).
56House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, 90.
57 Frank Peak interview;
58 l orn Giitter, “inside the “Liberation School',” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, December 18, 1969.
In e-mail correspondence over thirty years later, Giitter mused, “I remember eating a bowl o f chili with the 
kids at the Vivian Strong Memorial Liberation School while I was there — it was great chili.” Tom Giitter, 
e-mail message to author, December 16,2005.
59Tom Giitter , “Inside the “Liberation School’,” West Omaha-Dundee Sun, December 18, 1969.
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man holding a gun is not only in reference to the 
revolutionary struggle, but to the survival of poor 
people." The estimated operational cost of the school was 
between $125 and $150 per week, including meals. Money was 
raised by selling the Black Panther newsletter, buttons, 
posters and donations from church leaders. Grocery stores 
also were solicited for the donation of goods. The Omaha 
chapter also provided adult education programs. The Vivian 
Strong Liberation school was deemed so threatening that its 
leaders were federally subpoenaed. When called to testify 
before the grand jury Edward Poindexter, Bolden, Rice,
House, and Edward S. Brightman Jr., all Omaha Panthers, 
pled the fifth.61
From the beginning, the national Black Panther 
headquarters.did not like how the Midwestern chapters 
operated, so Kansas City, Des Moines, and Omaha often 
supported one another through "Midwest solidarity."62 The 
difference in viewpoints came down to a point which Frank 
Peak described in an interview: "Well, in the way people 
viewed things, I mean people here were Midwest people with 
Midwest ideas, ah, you just couldn't approach them the same
60Ibid.
61“Five Black Militants Take 5th Amendment,” Omaha World-Herald, December 12, 1969.
62Frank Peak interview.
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way as you approach people out of the West Coast."63 Also 
during this time there was an East versus West rivalry, and 
the Midwestern chapters were often ignored. "Numerous 
Midwestern Chapters were having a great deal of difficulty 
getting coverage in the paper— getting our articles printed, 
etc. . .So there was a lot of dissatisfaction among the 
Midwestern chapter about its relationship with national 
headquarters."64 In Omaha, members gave the Black Panther 
away causing conflict with national headquarters which 
wanted them to sell the newspaper and make a profit.65
In the January 4 ,  1 9 6 9  issue of the Black Panther, the 
central committee expressed concern about "provocateur 
agents, kooks and avaricious fools who found their way into 
the membership."66 By March 1 9 6 9  the first round of party 
expulsions took place. The Black Panther Party published 
the names of approximately 250 members who had been 
expelled from t h e ,organization for charges ranging from "no 
reason" to "reactionary" or "informer", "jive nigger" or 
"sexual fascist." The majority were expelled between March
63Ibid.
^David Rice interview.
65Frank Peak interview.
66U.S. Congress, House Committee on Internal Security. The Black Panther Party, Its Origin and  
Development as Reflected in its Official Weekly Newspaper: The Black Panther. 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
1970. House Report No. 482-4.
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and August 1969 with the largest number of expellees 
hailing from East Oakland, Vallejo,. Boston, Jersey City, 
and New York City.67 By June 1969, realizing a potentially * 
difficult situation, the Omaha branch made the following 
affirmation taken from Quotations from Chairman Mao' Tse- 
Tung or the "little red book":
WE must affirm anew the discipline of the Party,
1. The individual is subordinate to the organization.
2. The minority is subordinate to the majority.
3. The lower level is subordinate to the higher level; 
and
♦
4. The entire membership is subordinate to the Central 
committee
Whoever violates these, articles of discipline disrupts 
Party unity."68
Nearly a year later the Black Panther announced that
the "National Headquarters of the Black Panther Party would
like to inform the people that the National Committee to
Combat Fascism in Omaha, NE is no longer functioning as an
organizing bureau of the Black Panther Party, or from
therefore connected with the Black Panther Party in any
TT_,Tr // 6 9wa y .
The National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) was a 
Panther offshoot group which gained popularity after those 
initial- purges in 1969. The organization, whose national
68Ibid., 42.
69Ibid., 100.
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headquarters was located in Berkeley, California, served as 
the "organizing bureau" for the Black.Panther Party. The 
Black Panther Party felt that "the purpose of the community 
worker is to arm themselves with the ideology of the Black 
Panther Party and to arm themselves politically and 
militarily."70 The NCCF's specific task was "to raise the 
political level of the people, to educate them to the facts 
of how decadent, racist, exploitative this system really is 
and what must be done in order to change it."71 The local 
NCCF bureaus were referred to as community centers, and 
specific tasks or programs were to emanate from these 
locales.
David Hilliard confirmed that the Omaha chapter was no 
longer recognized and responded in only vague terms as to 
why the expulsion had happened.72 Representatives from the 
Kansas City and Des Moines chapters came to Omaha to hold a 
press conference informing the Omaha chapter could be 
reinstated but that it "had to get to work."73 Within days 
the Nebraska Chapter decided to renamed themselves the 
United Front Against Fascism (UFAF) and sent monthly
70House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970,4.
71Ibid., 3
72David Rice interview.
73Ibid.
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reports to headquarters via Kansas City in an attempt to 
regain its Status. In April of 1970, they were reinstated 
and were called the Nebraska Chapter of NCCF. Then, in just 
a matter of months, in late spring or early summer of 1970 
they were disbanded again.74 By 1970 the Des Moines group 
had also quit. The Kansas City group disbanded and 
reformed as a group called Sons of Malcolm.75 Although the 
Omaha chapter was officially disbanded, Poindexter pointed 
out, "that does not mean that we are going to stop serving 
the people. We are going to intensify our efforts if 
anything. "76
In an interview in 1982, Rice summed up the problems 
of the Omaha Panthers: "Part of the problem with the Black 
Panther Party was that it was so romantic— that its major 
appeal was to young African people in this country, and 
younger whites— and in most Panther rallies that I have 
seen, for example, films or photographs. . . the majority
of the people— they were white. Not black people."77 Rice 
also believed that the Black Panther party in Omaha did not
74Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76“Panthers Cut Omaha Link,” Omaha World-Herald, August 14, 1970.
77David Rice interview.
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have widespread appeal because there was "too much talk
about guns.' Too much rhetoric."78 He continued:
"There Was a lot of that attitude. And then also the 
Panther party did not have, I guess what I would call 
a real down to earth program. Well not the breakfast 
with the school children and that kind of thing it's 
okay, but and it does help to endear you to a 
community somewhat but the problem, that kind of 
program really does not gain you, I guess, credibility 
with some of the things you're saying, it's not 
enough.//79
He also claimed that two other problems hurt the 
Panthers: "communism scares African people in this
country." And "the community was beginning to see 
confrontations between Panthers and the police. And that 
scared them."80 
In sum:
Part of the problem with the Panther Party was it 
swallowed too much without chewing it. Often times, 
the rank and file of the Party were brothers and 
sisters who, though they may very well have been 
dedicated, and a lot of times for real, really did not 
have an ideology that they could call their own 
because they had been taught to parrot.81
Things like "the fascist pig", "the oppression of the power 
structure," he proclaimed, "ordinary folks don't want to
78Ibid.
79Ibid.
80Ibid.
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hear that shit. They want to hear the common ordinary 
language. "°2
U1LimaLely many things contributed to the downfall of 
Omaha's Black Panther Party. The least of these was the 
conflict between their revolutionary rhetoric and the 
average Midwesterner's political sensibilities.
Additionally, many established leaders, even the more 
radical such as Ernie Chambers, felt that the Panthers were 
mostly talk and little action.83 The final incident which 
ultimately brought about the demise of the Black Panther 
Party occurred on August 17, 197 0.
At 2 a.m. police officers were summoned to 2867 Ohio 
Street by a caller who had heard a woman screaming in the 
vacant house. Two of the eight responding officers entered 
the house and moments later a suitcase bomb exploded 
killing Officer Larry Minard and seriously injuring Officer 
John Tess.84 On April 17, 1917, a jury found David Rice and
Edward Poindexter guilty of first degree murder and the 
judge sentenced them to life imprisonment.85 Rice femarked,
82Ibid.
83Sen. Ernie Chambers interview; Marvin McClarty interview.
84Police injury report, August 17, 1970. Obtained from Omaha Police Headquarters, 505 South 
Fifteenth Street, Omaha, Nebraska.
85“David L. Rice Case,” Omaha World-Herald, July 6, 1976. The trial and subsequent convictions 
is still a hotly contested and emotional issue in Nebraska. Both men are listed as political prisoners by 
Amnesty International, USA. Thirty-five years later a grass-roots movement, Nebraskans for Justice, is
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"Of a half dozen people implicated, only two, Ed Poindexter 
and myself, were prosecuted. That's because we were 
political figures."86 As before, without strong leadership, 
the Black Panther Party withered and died, but for a brief 
time young black nationalist men in Omaha had an 
organization to call their own.
actively seeking an appeal. Much o f  the call for an appeal is based on the testimony o f then fifteen-year- 
old Duane Peak. Peak claimed he was the voice on the 911 call, but the tape was never admitted to trial. In 
court, Peak was noncommittal in testifying against Poindexter and Rice until after a short recess when Peak 
returned wearing dark sunglasses. When defense lawyer David Herzgog asked him to remove the glasses, 
an audible gasp was heard from the jury when they saw the teen’s swollen eyes. Many thought Peak had 
been assaulted by the police so as to intimidate him into giving false testimony. In 2003 Poindexter filed 
his first appeal since 1976 and was granted the right to have the tape analyzed by voice experts. Frances 
Mendenhall, “Maybe No ‘Criminal’,” Omaha World-Herald, June 19, 1997; Todd Cooper, “After 35 years, 
Witness Still Says He Was 911 Caller,” Omaha World-Herald, May 14, 2006; Amnesty Intemational-USA, 
“Long-Term Political Prisoners in the U.S.” Resolution 8, 1999, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/members/agmdecisions/detail.do?personid=TOO
86“Rice: Ruling Moves Nation Away From Democracy,” Omaha World-Herald, July 6, 1971.
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APPENDIX II 
BLACK PANTHER PARTY RULES
In the January 4, 1969 issue of the Black Panther the
"eight points of attention" and "three main rules of 
discipline" first appeared, which instructed members to be 
genteel, fair, and just.1. In order to be an official Party 
member each individual was require by headquarters to abide 
by the following:
1. Three, two hour political orientation classes a week.
2. Read two hours a day.
3. Sell at least seventy-five Black Panther newspapers.
4. Own and be proficient with two guns.
5. Obey all Party rules.
6. Engage in constant political work among the masses. 
Eight Points of Attention
1. Speak Politely.
2. Pay fairly for what you buy.
3. Return everything you borrow.
4. Pay for anything you damage.
1 U.S. Congress. House Committee on Internal Security, The Black Panther Party, Its Origin and  
Development as Reflected in its Official Weekly Newspaper: The Black Panther, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 
1970. House Report No. 482-4, 85.
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5. Do not hit or swear at people.
6. Do not damage property or crops of the poor oppressed
masses.
7. Do not take liberties with women.
8. If we ever have to take captives, do no ill treat
them.
Three main points of discipline
1. Obey orders in all your action.
2. Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from 
the "poor and oppressed" masses.
3. Turn in everything captured from the attacking enemy.
If the members did not fulfill the requirements they were 
expelled from the party.2
2 Ibid., 85-86.
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